

# RISK-BASED CAPITAL FOR INSURANCE: AN ECONOMIC BASIS

Robert P. Butsic  
CAS Annual Meeting  
November 12, 2014

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## Background

- Analytical approach to RBC requires a **risk measure**
  - Examples are VaR, EPD, TVaR
  - Each is a measure of tail risk
- A risk measure must be **calibrated**
  - Example is Solvency II, with VaR = 99.5%
- For a given tail risk, calibrated RM provides the required capital amount
- However, both the choice of RM and its calibration in current practice are largely arbitrary, with no underlying economic foundation
- Can we do better than this?

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## Yes We Can!

- Underlying economic basis for insurance establishes **policyholder welfare** approach to RBC
  - Developed while on AAA RBC Committee in 2008-2012
  - CAS RBC Dependency and Correlation Working Party
- Result is two papers, which serve as project reports:
  - *An Economic Basis for Property-Casualty Insurance Risk-Based Capital Measures*
    - One-period model
    - Implications for regulation, corporate governance, pricing
  - *Insurance Risk-Based Capital with a Multi-Period Time Horizon*
    - Extends results to multiple periods
    - Examines period length and other time-related factors

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### A Basic Economic Tradeoff

- More capital is better for policyholders
  - But capital is costly, so insurer can't hold too much of it
  - Thus, in principle, there must be an **optimal capital amount**
- How do we find the optimal amount?
  - Do we need to specify a risk measure?
  - Or is the risk measure determined by the underlying economic assumptions?
- The key notion is **how we value insurance**
  - We can value **complete protection** from loss
  - Use same method to determine value the **unprotected loss from insurer default**

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### The Value of Insurance

- Fundamental basis of insurance: policyholders are **risk-averse**
  - Therefore, they will pay more than expected value for coverage
  - The difference is the **consumer value** (consumer surplus)
- Risk-aversion can be quantified by an **adjusted probability distribution**
  - This formulation is the dual process for **expected utility**
  - The expected loss under the APD is called the **certainty-equivalent loss** ( $L^\wedge$ )
  - The CEL is the maximum the PH will pay for coverage
  - If the insurer charges the expected loss ( $L$ ), the CV is  $L^\wedge - L$

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### Optimal Capital Amount

- **One-period model** with no expenses, inv. income, etc.
- Value of insurance contract is  
 $V = \text{CEL} - \text{premium} - \text{CE value of default}$
- Premium =  $L + zC$ , where  $z$  is **frictional capital cost rate**
  - The premium compensates owners fairly
  - Both policyholders and insurer's owners are satisfied
- As  $C$  increases, premium goes up, but CED goes down
- So, there is an **optimum value** for  $C$ , obtained by the derivative of the insurance value  $V$
- Example next

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
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### The Proper Risk Measure

- Optimum occurs when the **adjusted ruin (default) probability  $Q^A$**  equals  $z$
- $Q^A$  is the proper risk measure
  - It is **not arbitrary** – it follows directly from the economic basis for insurance
  - The calibration is **not arbitrary**; it equals  $z$
  - The FCC rate is essentially the cost of double taxation
- The proper risk measure is **none** of the conventional RMs
  - These RMs (VaR, EPD) give **too little weight** to extreme tail loss amounts
  - They do not consider the PH risk aversion to these events
- The **subadditivity constraint** (a coherent RM property) for RMs is unnecessary

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### Implications for RBC

- **Regulatory RBC** will depend on optimal capital, but will be a lesser amount
- Several factors/variables **not currently considered** are important:
  - Individual behavior: risk aversion
  - Economic : interest rate
  - Government: guaranty fund participation, income tax rate
- **Asset risk** is modeled in same way as losses
  - Consumer value for asset risk is **negative**
  - Adjusted asset return is the **risk-free rate**

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### RBC for Multiple Periods

- Debate over basis for multi-period RBC
  - **Runoff** approach uses ultimate loss volatility
  - **Annual** approach uses current year loss volatility
- Extend one-period model to more periods by incorporating
  - **Stochastic loss development** process
  - Dynamic capital funding **strategy**
  - Effect of **technical insolvency** and conservatorship
  - Cost of raising **external capital**
- **Backward induction** method extends model beyond two periods

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### Results for Multi-period Model

- Optimal capital for multiple periods depends on **both annual and ultimate** time horizons
  - Losses develop to ultimate under conservatorship
- Thus, optimal capital amount is greater than under annual method
  - Optimal capital increases with **horizon length**
  - **Capital-raising costs** also increase initial optimal capital
- A shorter period length (capitalization interval) reduces optimal capital amount
  - Ability to raise and withdraw capital quickly reduces need for it
  - **Access to capital markets** is an important factor in determining optimal capital for an insurer

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### Concluding Remarks

- Main purpose is to **further our understanding** of how to establish risk-based capital for insurance losses and assets
- Lots of **work ahead** to implement this analysis
  - Need research on risk preferences
  - Simulation models ideally suited
- Nevertheless, **qualitative results** can be used; examples
  - Compared to conventional risk measures: **more capital** is needed for **high-risk** losses **less capital** is needed for **low-risk** losses
  - Lines of business with more **guaranty fund coverage** require less capital
  - Insurers with **limited ability** to raise capital (e.g., small mutuals) need more RBC than large stock insurers

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