

Wheels: Commercial Auto, Another Dip in the Road

Concurrent Session, Thursday, September 17, 10-11:15am

- Sylvia Yang, FCAS, MAAA, Lead Personal Lines Reserving Actuary, Farmers Insurance (Moderator)
- John Buchanan, FCAS, MAAA, Managing Principal, Verisk/ISO
- Sean Devlin, FCAS, MAAA, Team Lead Casualty Actuarial, Swiss Re

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CLRS 2020 – Wheels: Commercial Auto Bios



John Buchanan, FCAS, MAAA, is a principal in charge of ISO's Excess and Reinsurance Division. He has over 30 years of experience as a front-line pricing actuary and consultant in the US, London, and other international reinsurance marketplaces. In John's career, he has conceptualized, developed and implemented extensive benchmarking and modeling services for various reinsurers, excess carriers, and industry groups, and has been awarded with the 2020 Matthew Rodermund CAS career-long Service Award.

Sean Devlin, FCAS, MAAA Sean Devlin, FCAS, MAAA is a Team leader in the Casualty Actuarial Analytics department for Swiss Re North America. Sean currently leads a team of 6 Fellows costing reinsurance treaty business. He has 30 years of experience in the insurance industry with 22 years in reinsurance with Swiss Re. Prior to that he worked for Munich Re, USF&G and GEICO. Sean's focus the last several years has been on automobile business, both commercial and personal (including non-standard auto).

CS Agenda - Wheels: Commercial Auto, Another Dip in the Road



Introduction

Commercial auto update – John 20 mins

- Overall industry results through 12/31/2019 ups and downs over the last decade
- Review trends, LDFs, loss ratios, segments, ground-up vs excess, competitive underwriting cycle, rate changes, emergence lags, ILF pressures
- Deeper dive into tail lengthening ground-up and excess various markets

An actuary/underwriting managers perspective – Sean 20 mins

- State of the market for commercial and personal auto
- Future auto trends, including societal factors, jury impact, etc...
- Impact on portfolio loss ratios & reserving

COVID – Sean/John 20 mins

- Company perspective
- Great Recession dips, troughs, recoveries, shapes
- Relevance to Covid market sizing, shelter / pause / emergence issues
- Actuarial triangle principles applied to Covid emergence (WC analogy Fatalities, PT, PPTs)

Q&A 10 mins

hold questions until the end



Commercial Auto – Update to Prior CAS Webinar



Illustrative

This CLRS presentation provides an update and summary of the materials that were presented at this earlier CAS Webinar. These webinars are part of the "Wheels" series that have been presented at various CAS events over the last four years, tracking the ups and downs of this line.

The CAS webinar, along with the prior sessions, go into much more detail than can be covered in this session. In particular, the interested reader is encouraged to go to these prior recorded sessions to delve into more background on the loss and rating components of the commercial auto underwriting cycle, the effect of the emergence lag on results, pressures on increased limits, comparisons to personal auto, and a detailed investigation into social inflation.



Wheels – Commercial Auto is Getting Personal

CAS Webinar, May 21, 2020

Marni Wasserman, ACAS, MAAA, Actuarial Associate, Verisk/ISO
Jennifer Stevens, Head of Regional Casualty Treaty Underwriting, Swiss Re

SERVE | ADD VALUE | INNOVATE



To find previous slide deck from any CAS meeting: https://www.casact.org/education/index.cfm?fa=search

Commercial Auto Views from 2010 - 2019








Holistic view at 2010:

- On level Loss ratios going down since 2004
- Frequencies steadily reducing from early 2000s
- Severities overall recently flat, and 1.6% for the last 7 years
- Relatively quick LDF duration
 - avg GU reported loss = 1.2 yrs
- avg paid = 2.4 yrs
- Moderate reductions in rates since 2005
- Mostly BI claims but their trends ok as well
- This interconnected on-level line graphs show what various IELRs would be at current rate levels (useful for residual trend analysis)
- Overall, the 2010 on-level loss ratio compared to long term is 8 pts better (60.0% long-term vs. 51.9% current)






TTT Actual vs. Expected (ERLI Warning) – Excess Layer 900x100k Illustrative

Check to see if any early warning development signs in various layers and components.

Overall ok, except AY 2009 indicates a bit of a blip up – 252M expected, but 290M actual, or 15.2% adverse development.






| AY | Actual n-6 | Actual n-5 | 5-Yr ATA | Expected n-5 | AY | Actual increase | Expected increase | Actual - Expected | 9/. |
|-----------|----------------|----------------|----------|----------------|-----------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------|
| 2005 | 1,097,265,890 | 1,112,068,639 | 1.0135 | 1,112,059,126 | 2005 | 14,802,749.0 | 14,793,235.6 | 9,513.4 | 0.1% |
| 2006 | 1,066,637,325 | 1,112,815,458 | 1.0403 | 1,109,570,434 | 2006 | 46,178,133.0 | 42,933,109.1 | 3,245,023.9 | 7.6% |
| 2007 | 991,509,745 | 1,088,630,104 | 1.1063 | 1,096,882,077 | 2007 | 97,120,359.0 | 105,372,332.4 | (8,251,973.4) | -7.8% |
| 2008 | 722,271,219 | 888,533,303 | 1.2391 | 894,986,382 | 2008 | 166,262,084.0 | 172,715,163.5 | (6,453,079.5) | -3.7% |
| 2009 | 334,768,535 | 624,898,496 | 1.7525 | 586,678,587 | 2009 | 290,129,961.0 | 251,910,051.5 | 38,219,909.5 | 15.2% |
| 2010 | 25 25 | 372,698,496 | | S S | 2010 | | 330 (333) | | |
| Sum x2010 | 12,419,753,463 | 13,029,933,029 | | 13,010,201,530 | Sum x2015 | 610,179,566 | 590,448,067 | 19,731,499 | 3.3% |
| 1996-1999 | 3,028,045,461 | 3,027,332,760 | | 3,027,933,529 | 2001-2004 | (712,701) | (111,932) | (600,769) | -536.7% |
| 2000-2004 | 5,179,255,288 | 5,175,654,269 | | 5,182,091,395 | 2005-2009 | (3,601,019) | 2,836,107 | (6,437,126) | -227.0% |
| 2005-2009 | 4,212,452,714 | 4,826,946,000 | | 4,800,176,606 | 2010-2014 | 614,493,286 | 587,723,892 | 26,769,394 | 4.6% |



Due to frequencies and severities both ticking up since 2009, and rate levels not reacting until 2013, overall 2013 TTT IELR went from 51.9% to 62.8%






Incremental Rate Changes Through 3/31/2016 - Liability & Physical Damage

Rates reducing from 2005 to 2011, and importantly didn't go positive until 2012 even though loss trends changed direction 3 years earlier.

Larger policies, in general have larger rate reductions, and back to flat early 2016.






Source: ISO MarketWatch – released 6/15/2016; further details in Commercial Actuarial Panel – December 2016



The IELR for 2016 has moved to 73.0%, up from 51.9% at 2009. Rebounded frequency, heightened severity trends, lengthening development factors, coupled with rates that were still going down through 2012 account for the over 20 point increase.



Source: SOLM 2017v1 pre-release






There has been a steady decline in on-level results since 2009, with some initial apparent improvement in 2019. The decline was due to significantly higher average severity trends (1.6% 7-year trend 2009 to now 6.1%), reversal of steep frequency reductions, and significantly lengthening LDF tail.

For 2019, the steady improvement in rates, now in the 6-8% range, appears to somewhat reverse the higher loss levels.

Note that the above statistics don't reflect a potential under-reporting of losses that may have occurred during 1st qtr 2020 processing. This may cause future additional tail lengthening in 2020, among other various Covid pause issues.



Source: SOLM 2020v1 pre-release (using expanded MarketWatch method 3-new and renewal including impacts from ILFs)

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


Comparison of Results using On-level premium vs. Power Units - TTT

Overall increase in cost up by 52% per power unit, and up by 44% per on-level premium.

Leveling off of results since 2016 under both methods. The apparent modest improvement shown in 2019 may be due to some potential under reporting of losses processed in early 2020.

Illustrative




Source: SOLM 2020v1 pre-release; losses developed using 3-yr VWA; uses ISO MarketWatch 12/31/2019 rate changes – CA-TTT Liability; power units in months




Bodily injury is a somewhat larger portion of total (74.6% vs. 70.3% in 2009), and longer average reported loss and payment duration.

BI shows somewhat higher frequency trends but somewhat lower severity trends than total.






PD excess of 10k shows mostly increasing frequency trends beyond 3% and somewhat higher overall average severity trends, rising from 10k in 2008 to 16k in 2019 (60% increase)





Continued significant pressure on increased limits factors for layer 4.9M xs of 100k, going from low 20% in 2009 to around 35% currently, driven by higher frequency and steady severity trend.




Commercial Auto - View at 2020 - PPT



Private Passenger Types, which accounts for about 10% of the 8 Cau markets we analyze, continues significant adverse loss ratio trend since 2009. The current loss ratio is 83.6%, vs. long-term on-level average of 54.8%.

Higher overall recent severity trends (7-year 7.1%), coupled with rate changes that aren't nearly as high as most of the other Cau lines, accounts for the deterioration.



Source: SOLM 2019v1 pre-release using on-level premium as base SERVE | ADD VALUE | INNOVATE

Commercial Auto - View at 2020 - All CAu



Continuing Reported Lengthening Loss Development – 4.9M xs 100k

While excess LDF factors have continued to get longer over the last decade, the deterioration

has accelerated in the last 4 calendar years 2016 to 2019.

All views at 2020 use 3-year averages – if use more recent or trend LDFs, indications would be higher.

| | | Incurred \$ Inde | mnity+Alae (Pro | rata) Triangle | То | tal Commercial | Auto Liability | | | Illust | |
|----------|---------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|
| reshold | Threshold | | | | | | | | | | |
| Min | Max | | 12 | 24 | 36 | 48 | 60 | 72 | 84 | 96 | 108 |
| 52,190 | 2,609,462 | AY 1997 | 459,121,202 | 810,706,347 | 982,622,136 | 1,096,662,033 | 1,185,388,443 | 1,222,714,015 | 1,236,979,387 | 1,240,895,032 | 1,243,359,3 |
| 53,755 | 2,687,746 | AY 1998 | 470,376,384 | 797,235,139 | 1,005,015,187 | 1,172,020,498 | 1,236,693,801 | 1,257,813,051 | 1,268,179,614 | 1,270,262,411 | 1,271,558,9 |
| 55,368 | 2,768,378 | AY 1999 | 482,525,291 | 830,811,450 | 1,116,063,265 | 1,279,925,210 | 1,342,649,564 | 1,374,608,673 | 1,388,605,346 | 1,392,140,359 | 1,392,453,3 |
| 57,029 | 2,851,430 | AY 2000 | 473,001,413 | 849,479,950 | 1,128,595,269 | 1,297,606,598 | 1,371,946,590 | 1,385,234,582 | 1,385,477,094 | 1,391,435,329 | 1,389,935,4 |
| 58,740 | 2,936,973 | AY 2001 | 912,964,178 | 1,731,583,746 | 2,299,798,702 | 2,662,995,834 | 2,787,396,984 | 2,823,162,435 | 2,859,582,623 | 2,869,722,678 | 2,869,793,3 |
| 60,502 | 3,025,082 | AY 2002 | 861,313,373 | 1,649,128,318 | 2,185,980,875 | 2,450,873,303 | 2,577,486,443 | 2,653,460,094 | 2,678,103,820 | 2,681,606,877 | 2,684,149,1 |
| 62,317 | 3,115,834 | AY 2003 | 869,901,549 | 1,619,851,489 | 2,085,337,396 | 2,431,312,139 | 2,572,574,571 | 2,615,744,536 | 2,627,459,999 | 2,623,439,112 | 2,636,359,0 |
| 64,187 | 3,209,309 | AY 2004 | 986,175,263 | 1,812,631,600 | 2,301,776,950 | 2,635,054,127 | 2,775,830,011 | 2,832,458,360 | 2,847,109,564 | 2,861,795,195 | 2,868,403,9 |
| 66,112 | 3,305,589 | AY 2005 | 979,646,975 | 1,829,368,225 | 2,368,411,351 | 2,719,106,383 | 2,857,401,931 | 2,895,978,065 | 2,931,037,695 | 2,938,329,298 | 2,936,629,4 |
| 68,096 | 3,404,756 | AY 2006 | 1,008,809,762 | 1,888,793,229 | 2,427,596,708 | 2,741,938,813 | 2,873,140,729 | 2,925,958,497 | 2,949,932,155 | 2,961,557,718 | 2,968,981,9 |
| 70,138 | 3,506,899 | AY 2007 | 998,209,424 | 1,857,353,185 | 2,413,693,715 | 2,713,786,956 | 2,832,390,291 | 2,898,679,484 | 2,915,703,747 | 2,929,865,190 | 2,940,859,3 |
| 72,243 | 3,612,106 | AY 2008 | 880,018,811 | 1,606,291,829 | 2,071,822,518 | 2,283,305,510 | 2,405,541,763 | 2,451,715,330 | 2,478,317,514 | 2,485,652,492 | 2,495,034,6 |
| 74,410 | 3,720,469 | AY 2009 | 714,675,711 | 1,372,908,145 | 1,718,554,920 | 2,004,773,593 | 2,125,154,303 | 2,185,379,182 | 2,193,564,724 | 2,205,485,600 | 2,210,867,3 |
| 76,642 | 3,832,083 | AY 2010 | 702,551,820 | 1,356,194,197 | 1,816,716,534 | 2,088,823,949 | 2,275,821,897 | 2,324,124,098 | 2,356,488,827 | 2,373,773,029 | 2,381,240,5 |
| 78,941 | 3,947,046 | AY 2011 | 751,407,849 | 1,473,437,967 | 1,944,227,210 | 2,308,545,982 | 2,483,833,458 | 2,570,360,541 | 2,599,659,486 | 2,613,047,279 | 2,619,671,8 |
| 81,310 | 4,065,457 | AY 2012 | 785,921,534 | 1,560,787,469 | 2,167,947,364 | 2,525,647,258 | 2,744,781,662 | 2,811,993,951 | 2,850,409,856 | 2,851,981,295 | |
| 83,749 | 4,187,421 | AY 2013 | 759,940,838 | 1,575,239,154 | 2,169,190,100 | 2,640,164,491 | 2,871,349,311 | 2,955,321,968 | 2,998,577,537 | | |
| 86,261 | 4,313,043 | AY 2014 | 862,437,115 | 1,621,451,175 | 2,299,915,262 | 2,802,147,829 | 3,071,176,514 | 3,168,917,871 | | | |
| 88,849 | 4,442,435 | AY 2015 | 910,865,311 | 1,882,357,791 | 2,694,453,953 | 3,326,556,116 | 3,619,468,031 | | | | |
| 91,515 | 4,575,708 | AY 2016 | 992,521,253 | 2,044,514,150 | 2,959,471,866 | 3,602,912,197 | | | | | |
| 94,260 | 4,712,979 | AY 2017 | 983,831,328 | 2,057,799,370 | 2,956,947,949 | | | | | | |
| 97,088 | 4,854,368 | AY 2018 | 978,631,336 | 2,134,533,566 | | | | | | | |
| 100,001 | 5,000,000 | AY 2019 | 941,241,497 | | | | | | | | |
| CY tots- | 2014,2015,201 | 6,2017,2018,2019: | 39,066,517,320 | 41,934,860,409 | 45,413,695,915 | 49,123,129,321 | 53,154,400,221 | 57,246,901,005 | | | |

| | 24/12 | 36/24 | 48/36 | 60/48 | 72/60 | 84/72 | 96/84 | 108/96 | 120/108 |
|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|---------|
| AY 1997 | 1.766 | 1.212 | 1.116 | 1.081 | 1.031 | 1.012 | 1.003 | 1.002 | 1.001 |
| VY 1998 | 1.695 | 1.261 | 1.166 | 1.055 | 1.017 | 1.008 | 1.002 | 1.001 | 1.001 |
| AY 1999 | 1.722 | 1.343 | 1.147 | 1.049 | 1.024 | 1.010 | 1.003 | 1.000 | 0.999 |
| Y 2000 | 1.796 | 1.329 | 1.150 | 1.057 | 1.010 | 1.000 | 1.004 | 0.999 | 1.000 |
| AY 2001 | 1.897 | 1.328 | 1.158 | 1.047 | 1.013 | 1.013 | 1.004 | 1.000 | 1.001 |
| Y 2002 | 1.915 | 1.326 | 1.121 | 1.052 | 1.029 | 1.009 | 1.001 | 1.001 | 1.003 |
| Y 2003 | 1.862 | 1.287 | 1.166 | 1.058 | 1.017 | 1.004 | 0.998 | 1.005 | 1.002 |
| AY 2004 | 1.838 | 1.270 | 1.145 | 1.053 | 1.020 | 1.005 | 1.005 | 1.002 | 1.000 |
| Y 2005 | 1.867 | 1.295 | 1.148 | 1.051 | 1.014 | 1.012 | 1.002 | 0.999 | 1.001 |
| AY 2006 | 1.872 | 1.285 | 1.129 | 1.048 | 1.018 | 1.008 | 1.004 | 1.003 | 1.000 |
| Y 2007 | 1.861 | 1.300 | 1.124 | 1,044 | 1.023 | 1.006 | 1.005 | 1.004 | 1.000 |
| AY 2008 | 1.825 | 1.290 | 1.102 | 1.054 | 1.019 | 1.011 | 1.003 | 1.004 | 1.002 |
| NY 2009 | 1.921 | 1.252 | 1.167 | 1.060 | 1.028 | 1.004 | 1.005 | 1.002 | 1.001 |
| NY 2010 | 1.930 | 1.340 | 1.150 | 1.090 | 1.021 | 1.014 | 1.007 | 1.003 | 1.001 |
| AY 2011 | 1.961 | 1.320 | 1.187 | 1.076 | 1.035 | 1.011 | 1.005 | 1.003 | |
| AY 2012 | 1.986 | 1.389 | 1.165 | 1.087 | 1.024 | 1.014 | 1.001 | | |
| AY 2013 | 2.073 | 1.377 | 1.217 | 1.088 | 1.029 | 1.015 | | | |
| AY 2014 | 1,880 | 1.418 | 1.218 | 1.096 | 1.032 | | | | |
| AY 2015 | 2.067 | 1.431 | 1.235 | 1.088 | | | | | |
| AYZ | 2.060 | 1.448 | 1.217 | | | | | | |
| | 2.092 | 1.437 | | | | | | | |
| ear | 2.181 | | | | | | | | |



TTT - Reserve Run-off Test @12/31/2019 - 4.9M xs 100k

Comparing to initial selected excess losses at 12 months using a mechanical 7-year average, produces deterioration over 10% for accident years 2009 to 2016.


All subsequent years continue the same pattern of deterioration.

ISO SOLM 2020 v1 - Development Triangle and Analysis Ex-ante Reserving Analysis Runoff Tests (through 12/31/2019)

Market Analysis: CA-TTT - All Carriers

Assumptions: Incurred \$ Indemnity+Alae (Prorata); 4,900,000 xs 100,000; 7 yr VWA (100% wt); 3.0% detrended threshold

Illustrative



| | Select Metric here: | | | CY2019 | CY2018 | CY2017 | CY2016 | CY2015 | CY2014 | CY2013 | CY2012 | CY2011 | CY2010 | CY2009 | CY2008 | CY2007 | CY2006 | CY2005 |
|-------------|---------------------|---------------|------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|-----------------------|----------------|--------------|
| % Adverse | Ultimate Est. | 12.013.07.07 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (Favorable) | INCURRED @12 | Adverse (Fav) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Development | mos | Devt | AY | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 |
| 5.7% | 897,902,649 | 50,740,598 | 2000 | (12,930) | (149,758) | (14,243) | (37,007) | (261,486) | 425,081 | 733,592 | (512,896) | 818,798 | (1,110,327) | (2,139,611) | (2,344,311) | 4,181,288 | (9,234,565) | (14,676,518) |
| 4.6% | 1,010,768,029 | 16,375,429 | 2001 | 787,419 | (5,344) | (2,957) | (428,489) | 807,970 | (213,803) | 623,967 | (1,001,009) | (817,958) | (102,505) | (3,066,717) | (907,864) | (1,584,648) | (16,274,319) | (27,122,001) |
| -5.6% | 1,071,433,069 | (60,448,675) | 2002 | 1,146,292 | 38,190 | (78,068) | 207,792 | 481,517 | 885,639 | 1,093,401 | 411,217 | (1,580,076) | (315,301) | (2,110,163) | (2,471,368) | 6,326,387 | (26,864,870) | (39,421,521) |
| -5.5% | 1,159,649,320 | (63,719,021) | 2003 | 7,567 | (93,610) | 173,138 | (156,304) | (923,686) | (621,565) | (872,661) | 604,636 | 3,712,828 | (5,013,395) | (4,041,767) | (3,539,561) | (12,460,534) | (6,311,222) | (34,072,725) |
| -7.1% | 1,284,575,460 | (91,473,173) | 2004 | 497,267 | 321,963 | 759,334 | 162,091 | (105,645) | (2,126,179) | (570,204) | 884,918 | 1,341,638 | (3,893,278) | (1,657,873) | (3,340,037) | (37,904,958) | (38,294,783) | (7,547,426) |
| -6.6% | 1,286,702,227 | (84,283,460) | 2005 | 739,633 | (341,665) | 6,814 | (750,450) | 395,695 | 1,158,628 | (77,579) | 956,896 | 5,082,412 | 1,949,461 | (5,330,134) | (19,922,005) | (48,131,203) | (20,019,965) | |
| -5.0% | 1,251,809,595 | (62,032,543) | 2006 | 7,797 | (753,901) | 218,520 | 239,219 | (1,999,062) | 2,061,251 | (487,251) | 600,397 | (2,488,640) | 6,081,552 | (32,750,289) | (23,247,505) | (9,514,632) | | |
| -4.3% | 1,262,720,573 | (54,204,881) | 2007 | 355,794 | (1,297,617) | 202,947 | 1,471,755 | 2,039,102 | (1,820,791) | 2,868,812 | 4,264,750 | 1,846,213 | (15,739,003) | (24,621,962) | (23,774,881) | | | |
| -4.5% | 1,147,287,274 | (51,108,491) | 2008 | 816,118 | (1,763,331) | 2,964,483 | (1,515,357) | 1,160,284 | 5,035,009 | (1,656,175) | 1,382,019 | (9,367,983) | (13,927,997) | (34,235,562) | | | | |
| 12.9% | 832,718,476 | 107,224,480 | 2009 | (959,446) | 1,856,248 | 2,252,855 | 7,329,472 | (2,465,369) | 2,803,857 | 9,340,997 | 27,988,561 | 6,628,998 | 52,448,309 | | | | | |
| 12.2% | 910,799,779 | 111,055,180 | 2010 | (592,141) | (348,424) | 7,229,646 | 7,490,679 | 2,612,416 | 28,807,488 | 7,128,177 | 35,964,636 | 24,762,703 | Minimum | Maximum | Actual vs Expe | cted Developm | ent: AY x CY | |
| 12.3% | 1,030,242,376 | 126,705,244 | 2011 | 1,626,765 | (4,444,210) | 4,962,160 | 11,363,461 | 16,524,671 | 33,331,743 | 18,441,090 | 44,899,562 | | -3.7% | -1.3% | 17 | Favorable developr | nent | |
| 14.2% | 1,034,165,518 | 146,546,304 | 2012 | (4,277,153) | 1,686,291 | (2,452,915) | 32,188,727 | 12,692,051 | 45,382,241 | 61,327,062 | | | -1.3% | -0.1% | 39 | Somewhat favorable | le | |
| 16.7% | 1,113,782,286 | 185,866,945 | 2013 | 1,151,207 | 4,598,386 | 30,177,928 | 68,596,690 | 24,495,023 | 56,847,711 | | | | -0.1% | 0.1% | 63 | Within +-0.1% of orig | ginal estimate | |
| 12.9% | 1,272,261,912 | 163,839,064 | 2014 | (13,595,076) | 33,840,346 | 59,537,783 | 102,242,930 | (18,186,925) | | | | | 0.1% | 2.7% | 50 | Somewhat adverse | | |
| 14.8% | 1,338,654,998 | 198,733,711 | 2015 | (2,384,344) | 84,613,671 | 36,432,421 | 80,071,963 | | | | | | 2.7% | 8.0% | 21 | Adverse developm | ent | |
| 12.5% | 1,553,070,539 | 194,700,116 | 2016 | 16,240,200 | 103,114,471 | 75,345,446 | | | | | | | | ,000 | 190 | of AY x CY cells to | ested | |
| 8.7% | 1,616,676,652 | 141,304,681 | 2017 | 66,183,158 | 75,121,524 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2.0% | 1 803 489 008 | 36 264 450 | 2018 | 36 264 450 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Sources: Using pre-release SOLM 2019 v2 - mechanical selections of VWA (100% 7-year)

or rou.



2.5%

2019

All CAu National Carriers – Reserve Run-off Test @12/31/2019 – # xs 100k

Illustrative


20.5%

2018

19.6%

Comparing to initial selected excess loss frequencies at 12 months using a mechanical 7-year average, produces deterioration over 10% for accident years 2011 to 2016.

All years from 2012 have large loss deterioration.



25.0%

20.0%

5.0%

- ALAE

15.0%

10.0%

CA - National Carriers - Unlimited xs 100,000

3.0%

5.6%

16.2%

10.9%

Sources: Using pre-release SOLM 2019 v2 – mechanical selections of VWA (100% 7-year)

2015

2016

Adverse development


2,485 2,624


Underwriting Cycle Analysis – Initial Investigation





Research done over the last few years was centered around investigating why company results were so dramatically different from each other. Like the LDF patterns, we found companies had strikingly different results.

We investigated things like how correlated are capital size and reinsurance ceded to results. We did find there was some impact of each, but not overwhelming.










Note: Total loss ratios (2001-2016) use 20 year loss triangles and all-year LDFs; each individual company uses credibility weighted all-year industry factors, split between Fast and Slow for apriori


Source: Verisk Monday Webinar – 10/1/2018 – John Buchanan, Marni Wasserman (recorded)


Underwriting Cycle Analysis – Further Investigation Profit / LDF Speed



However when investigating LDF Speed and Profitability, we found a significant correlation. Companies that don't recognize the are longer than industry LDFs, very strongly have much worse ultimate loss ratios. Almost every one of the 44 markets we analyzed (besides short-tail property lines) experienced this important connection.








Note: See Verisk Monday Webinar on link between LDF Speed and Profitability (9/11/2017 – J. Buchanan and M. Wasserman)

Competitive Underwriting Cycle - Further Investigation Profit / LDF Speed



We are investigating "why" profit is often strongly correlated to loss development speed. We have a few competitive marketplace hypotheses:

- The first is that faster reporting companies may get an earlier more accurate reading of results, and be able to reprice their business more quickly when circumstances change
- The second is that slower companies, especially those that don't know they are slow, may have a downward bias in establishing lower loss development parameters for their models
- Especially in a highly competitive environment, slower LDF companies may for example assume that losses are fully reported by 8 years rather than the full length of the pattern at 20+ years
- These companies may ultimately have higher loss ratios when the losses do indeed emerge against lower charged premiums
- There may also be an additional pricing component for longer tailed companies to factor in additional investment income. But this may be mitigated by lower interest rates and payment patterns that don't vary as much as the reporting patterns



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Commercial Auto – State Group X Expected Loss 900x100 based on AS Circular ILF

Illustrative

| Policy | State Group | Limited | Indicated | |
|----------|-------------|----------|--------------|--|
| Limit | Basic Limit | Average | Increased | |
| (\$,000) | Loss Weight | Severity | Limit Factor | |
| 100 | 0.0148 | 18,529 | 1.00 | |
| 250 | 0.0010 | 28,100 | 1.52 | |
| 300 | 0.0153 | 30,374 | 1.64 | |
| 400 | 0.0003 | 34,152 | 1.84 | |
| 500 | 0.0294 | 37,169 | 2.01 | |
| 750 | 0.0011 | 42,582 | 2.30 | |
| 1,000 | 0.8664 | 46,214 | 2.49 | |
| 1,500 | 0.0001 | 50,983 | 2.75 | |
| 2,000 | 0.0590 | 54,160 | 2.92 | |
| 2,500 | 0.0000 | 56,517 | 3.05 | |
| 3,000 | 0.0022 | 58,372 | 3.15 | |
| 5,000 | 0.0104 | 63,237 | 3.41 | |
| 7,500 | 0.0000 | 66,793 | 3.60 | |
| 10,000 | 0.0000 | 69,157 | 3.73 | |

| Policy Limit | 300k | 1M | 5M |
|------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| 100 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 |
| 250 | 1,517 | 1,517 | 1,517 |
| 300 | 1,639 | 1,639 | 1,639 |
| 400 | 1,843 | 1,843 | 1,843 |
| 500 | 2,006 | 2,006 | 2,006 |
| 750 | 2,298 | 2,298 | 2,298 |
| 1000 | 2,494 | 2,494 | 2,494 |
| 1500 | 2,752 | 2,752 | 2,752 |
| 2000 | 2,923 | 2,923 | 2,923 |
| 2500 | 3,050 | 3,050 | 3,050 |
| 3000 | 3,150 | 3,150 | 3,150 |
| 5000 | 3,413 | 3,413 | 3,413 |
| 7500 | 3,605 | 3,605 | 3,605 |
| 10000 | 3,732 | 3,732 | 3,732 |
| 900x100 Expected | | | |
| Loss % | 39.0% | 59.9% | 43.8% |
| Loss Weight | 7.5% | 85.0% | 7.5% |

Weighted Expected Loss % 57.1%


Note: Weights provided in the circular can be used to combine expected loss percentages from state groups and classes.





Commercial Auto – State Group X


900 x 100 – Partial Loss Ratio (3% detrended)

Illustrative










Note: premiums are on-leveled to 12/31/2018 using ISO MWDB Method 2 (new and renewal) indications additional adjustments for historical changes in deductibles, limits and other exposure adjustments would be required for a full comparison to AS Circular ILF results






Review of Reported and Paid, \$ and # Settlement Patterns by Company Speed; Introduce 3/6 mo.lags

| | | 12 | 24 | 36 | 48 | 60 | 72 | 84 | 96 | 108 | 120 |
|-----------|----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Medium \$ | % Reptd - 7-Yr | 18.7% | 35.6% | 52.5% | 65.8% | 74.0% | 79.7% | 83.6% | 86.6% | 89.5% | 91.8% |
| # | % Reptd - 7-Yr | 52.9% | 67.5% | 76.4% | 82.0% | 85.6% | 88.0% | 90.5% | 92.8% | 93.5% | 95.4% |
| \$ | % Paid - 7-Yr | 3.7% | 13.3% | 27.1% | 43.2% | 57.8% | 67.9% | 74.8% | 80.5% | 84.4% | 88.2% |
| # | % Paid - 7-Yr | 28.3% | 53.8% | 67.5% | 75.6% | 80.7% | 84.0% | 87.0% | 89.3% | 91.5% | 93.9% |
| Slow \$ | % Reptd - 7-Yr | 12.8% | 25.7% | 39.5% | 50.7% | 59.1% | 66.5% | 71.9% | 76.3% | 81.1% | 84.3% |
| # | % Reptd - 7-Yr | 51.5% | 63.7% | 74.0% | 80.0% | 83.9% | 86.9% | 90.2% | 94.6% | 92.7% | 95.6% |
| \$ | % Paid - 7-Yr | 2.9% | 9.9% | 20.7% | 34.6% | 47.2% | 55.6% | 64.1% | 70.1% | 75.5% | 80.6% |
| # | % Paid - 7-Yr | 21.9% | 44.4% | 59.9% | 68.9% | 74.9% | 79.0% | 83.0% | 86.6% | 89.9% | 93.9% |







Are Tails Lengthening? All Casualty Lines

Illustrative

The 55 data points from 2009-2018 at yearly development evaluations were analyzed for the level of adverse or favorable development. Since 2009, for all casualty lines, it appears that there is more adverse development. 36 of the 55 data points had at least some adverse development.

But difficult to solve actuarial puzzle: are claims that were originally going to be reported later now being reported earlier due to e.g. claim speed-up improvements and/or companies putting up healthier reserves? Are claim patterns just lengthening? How will these diagonals (and AY's) react under Covid Pause and recovery scenarios?

ISO SOLM 2020 v1 - Development Triangle and Analysis Ex-ante Reserving Analysis Runoff Tests (through 12/31/2019)

Market Analysis: All Com Cas Lines - All Class Groups - All Carriers

Assumptions: Incurred \$ Indemnity+Alae (Prorata); 900,000 xs 100,000; 7 yr VWA (100% wt); 3.0% detrended threshold

| Select Metric here: | | | CY2019 | CY2018 | CY2017 | CY2016 | CY2015 | CY2014 | CY2013 | CY2012 | CY2011 |
|-------------------------------|---------------|------|--------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|------------------------------|--------------|--------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| Ultimate Est. INCURRED @12 | Adverse (Fav) | | | | | | | | | | |
| mos | Devt | AY | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| 3,478,271,562 | (27,361,472) | 2000 | (3,351,320) | (905,197) | 5,795,708 | (6,567,830) | (1,292,707) | 7,354,957 | 7,224,473 | (11,321,342) | 4,452,527 |
| 6,043,547,660 | (824,997,896) | 2001 | 1,441,850 | (1,292,080) | (2,350,975) | 2,563,414 | (7,999,263) | 20,799,510 | (19,371,363) | 1,775,504 | (20,694,949 |
| 6,595,789,276 | (902,023,795) | 2002 | (7,458,963) | (1,332,521) | 4,716,731 | 4,077,724 | 1,780,589 | 11,613,890 | (13,187,097) | (9,190,885) | 9,229,973 |
| 6,381,553,199 | (694,178,205) | 2003 | (5,363,632) | 1,290,477 | 3,256,304 | (5,778,397) | (37,525) | (6,563,005) | 11,784,675 | (13,755,734) | (3,742,793 |
| 6,320,571,982 | (652,584,024) | 2004 | (871,581) | 4,748,811 | 4,334,930 | (3,726,654) | (7,575,623) | (5,680,673) | (17,370,015) | (13,118,257) | (18,231,674 |
| 6,331,883,201 | (415,385,490) | 2005 | (6,260,201) | 14,316,278 | 5,131,040 | (5,043,307) | (12,249,692) | 12,565,317 | (9,253,500) | 8,168,320 | (2,849,487 |
| 6,720,496,402 | (438,690,950) | 2006 | (1,671,448) | (3,654,612) | 8,257,114 | 4,171,933 | (12,738,148) | (19,815,594) | 20,095,044 | (3,264,364) | (21,850,254 |
| 7,247,544,278 | (306,811,681) | 2007 | 10,711,407 | 11,302,295 | 14,443,528 | 20,061,470 | (3,483,448) | 13,115,592 | 5,299,381 | 25,494,821 | (59,168,310 |
| 6,030,155,063 | 163,131,215 | 2008 | (2,269,948) | 8,024,418 | 9,113,913 | (11,265,400) | 3,394,090 | 37,271,752 | 40,308,236 | 117,620,793 | (58,266,36 |
| 5,196,895,566 | 407,927,014 | 2009 | (10,409,611) | 17,290,716 | 1,301,926 | 11,306,240 | (18,498,112) | 55,160,665 | 84,233,875 | 140,161,174 | (63,281,576 |
| 5,688,902,008 | 242,463,995 | 2010 | (11,348,743) | 1,332,194 | 9,933,448 | 2,565,867 | (9,044,583) | 91,090,136 | 42,903,313 | 125,534,403 | (10,502,040 |
| 5,197,787,837 | 562,228,607 | 2011 | 354,768 | 11,113,732 | 32,039,393 | 45,708,008 | 56,646,655 | 153,440,601 | 68,998,960 | 193,926,490 | |
| 5,113,260,003 | 571,898,880 | 2012 | (11,659,638) | 37,723,893 | 16,809,244 | 83,177,449 | 107,509,429 | 237,681,122 | 100,657,380 | - III - Dimensional Company | |
| 5,129,114,366 | 834.549.324 | 2042 | 0.500.000 | 15,500,100 | 444 070 00F | 400 400 707 | 179 208 892 | 292,127,164 | | | |
| 0,000,091,725 | 320,651,548 | 2014 | 42,679,350 | 85,548,564 | 139,637,124 | 142,745,470 | (89,958,960) | | | | |
| 6.383,505,053 | 638,544,783 | 2015 | 55,012,317 | 270,569,904 | 239,780,423 | 73,182,139 | MI - COMMITTEE OF THE SECOND | | | | |
| 6,979,384,103 | 40011011000 | 2042 | 404 PPO OEP | 222 607 956 | 20 005 125 | | | | | | |
| 7,439,322,304 | 353,878,684 | 2017 | 282,771,282 | 71,107,401 | | | | | | | |
| 8 102 722 512 | 64 363 635 | 2048 | 64 363 635 | | | | | | | | |

| Minimum | Maximum | Actual vs Exp | ected Development: AY x CY |
|---------|---------|---------------|------------------------------------|
| -4.3% | -1.8% | 0 | Favorable development |
| -1.8% | -0.5% | 2 | Somewhat favorable |
| -0.5% | 0.5% | 17 | Within +-0.5% of original estimate |
| 0.5% | 2.2% | 23 | Somewhat adverse |
| 2.2% | 5.7% | 13 | Adverse development |

Source: ISO Monday Webinar Series – Reserve Runoffs and Distorted Analytics - 8/31/2020




Are Tails Lengthening? Excess Incurred \$ Indemnity + ALAE (Pro Rata) - Casualty

Illustrative

The adverse development in recent years is being driven by casualty lines (Commercial Auto, General Liability, Umbrella (34 Markets out of 69 total Markets)).

Here, on average, 52.8% of the 55 data points since 2009 show adverse development, while only 27.6% show favorable development.




Sources: Using SOLM 2018 v2 using excess layer 900,000 xs 100,000



Are Tails Lengthening? Excess Incurred \$ Indemnity + ALAE (Pro Rata) – Commercial Auto Illustrative

Looking at Commercial Auto we see this same trend of higher adverse development, at 55.2%. The amount of favorable development is slightly higher than that of neutral development, at 22.8% and 22.0% respectively.




Sources: Using SOLM 2018 v2 using excess layer 900,000 xs 100,000



Are Tails Lengthening? Excess Paid \$ Indemnity + ALAE (Pro Rata) – Commercial Auto

Illustrative

Looking at paid loss dollars for Commercial Auto, we see that the majority of data points are showing adverse development at 53.7%, which indicates that tails are lengthening.



Sources: Using SOLM 2018 v2 using excess layer 900,000 xs 100,000


Personal Auto




Personal vs. Commercial Auto – View at 2019



Personal Auto Paid Severity trends tend to be lower than that of Commercial Auto.







| | | 7 Yr | All Yr |
|-----------|------------|-------|--------|
| Liability | Personal | 3.79% | 2.87% |
| | Commercial | 5.69% | 4.30% |
| Physical | Personal | 3.91% | 2.51% |
| Damage | Commercial | 3.44% | 4.24% |
| Total | Personal | 3.83% | 2.76% |
| | Commercial | 5.21% | 4.29% |

Personal vs. Commercial Auto – View at 2019



Personal Auto Paid Frequency trends tend to be higher than that of Commercial Auto, but both sets are relatively flat or negative.







| | | 7 Yr | All Yr |
|-----------|------------|--------|--------|
| Liability | Personal | 0.29% | -0.87% |
| | Commercial | 0.39% | -3.01% |
| Physical | Personal | -0.06% | -1.20% |
| Damage | Commercial | -1.65% | -2.70% |
| Total | Personal | 0.15% | -1.10% |
| | Commercial | -0.04% | -2.94% |

Personal vs. Commercial Auto – View at 2019



Personal Auto Pure Premium trends tend to be lower than Commercial Auto in the more recent years, but somewhat higher over all years.






| | | 7 Yr | All Yr |
|-----------|------------|-------|--------|
| Liability | Personal | 4.08% | 2.00% |
| | Commercial | 6.10% | 1.16% |
| Physical | Personal | 3.85% | 1.32% |
| Damage | Commercial | 1.73% | 1.43% |
| Total | Personal | 3.98% | 1.66% |
| | Commercial | 5.17% | 1.22% |






General Observations Commercial Auto


- Elevated loss & comb ratios due to loss trend and adverse development (\$2.6B in 2019)
- CAL 2019 Combined ratio @ 108.9%, 9th year in a row above 100%.
- Rising rates; high single digits (but not enough)
- Frequency pressure is driven by increased utilization, distracted driving, and driver shortages.
- Plaintiff attorney interest in 8 figure court awards for severe cases, a new litigation revenue stream. This and other forms of social inflation put pressure on severity.
- Technology such as ADAS & cameras will lead to reduction in accidents but take-up is slow
- TNC growth, Uber and Lyft IPOs in 2019







Commercial Auto Market Snapshot Net Basis











Commercial Auto Market Snapshot Variation in Loss Ratios

| Rank | Entity Name | 3 Yr Avg (%) | 5 Yr Avg (%) |
|------|---|--------------|--------------|
| 1 | Progressive (SNL P&C Group) | 65.2 | 64.7 |
| 2 | Travelers (SNL P&C Group) | 76.7 | 71.8 |
| 3 | Liberty Mutual (SNL P&C Group) | 91.8 | 84.8 |
| 4 | Nationwide (SNL P&C Group) | 80.0 | 78.7 |
| 5 | Old Republic Insurance (SNL P&C Group) | 77.5 | 75.9 |
| 6 | Berkshire Hathaw ay Inc. (SNL P&C Group) | 73.0 | 71.8 |
| 7 | Zurich (SNL P&C Group) | 84.2 | 80.6 |
| 8 | Auto-Owners Insurance (SNL P&C Group) | 72.2 | 71.6 |
| 9 | Chubb (SNL P&C Group) | 66.5 | 65.9 |
| 10 | Allstate Corp (SNL P&C Group) | 76.6 | 78.1 |
| 11 | State Farm (SNL P&C Group) | 83.4 | 83.6 |
| 12 | The Hartford (SNL P&C Group) | 71.0 | 73.4 |
| 13 | Tokio Marine (SNL P&C Group) | 71.2 | 72.3 |
| 14 | Great American Insurance (SNL P&C Group) | 68.8 | 70.9 |
| 15 | The Cincinnati Insurance Cos. (SNL P&C Group) | 69.6 | 70.9 |


| Rank | Entity Name | 3 Yr Avg (%) | 5 Yr Avg (%) |
|------|--|--------------|--------------|
| 16 | W. R. Berkley Corp. (SNL P&C Group) | 64.7 | 66.3 |
| 17 | AIG (SNL P&C Group) | 111.6 | 113.8 |
| 18 | Fairfax Financial (SNL P&C Group) | 72.0 | 69.8 |
| 19 | Erie Insurance (SNL P&C Group) | 73.6 | 70.7 |
| 20 | Farmers Insurance (SNL P&C Group) | 70.1 | 66.7 |
| 21 | Selective (SNL P&C Group) | 73.5 | 70.8 |
| 22 | Sentry (SNL P&C Group) | 78.6 | 75.4 |
| 23 | EMC Insurance (SNL P&C Group) | 69.3 | 70.6 |
| 24 | ACUITY A Mutual Insurance Co. | 66.1 | 67.7 |
| 25 | Federated Insurance (SNL P&C Group) | 73.0 | 73.9 |
| 26 | CNA (SNL P&C Group) | 64.1 | 63.5 |
| 27 | Markel (SNL P&C Group) | 69.3 | 71.3 |
| 28 | James River Group Hldgs Ltd. (SNL P&C Group) | 87.2 | 82.8 |
| 29 | AmTrust Financial (SNL P&C Group) | 103.5 | 100.0 |
| 30 | AXA SA (SNL P&C Group) | 86.2 | 87.1 |



General Observations Personal Auto


- Return to Underwriting profit in 2018 after 10 consecutive years of CR > 100%. CR for 2018 was 97.7%. 2019 was similar at 98.2%.
- Favorable loss reserve development during CY2018 of over \$800M followed by over \$400M in 2019
- Price increases slowing due to competition, dominant players (e.g. State Farm) looking to recapture lost market share.
- Vehicle sales slowing leading to lower exposures
- Frequency is improving due to safety features and flattening of miles driven. Severity remains a concern
- Non-standard market showing improvement, but hazard profile remains high (10 year average CR @ 105%)
- Product development is influenced by innovation from tech firms, vehicle manufacturers, ridesharing companies, and now ILS specialists


Covid Update: Drastic reduction in private passenger transportation Lower frequency Premium refunds to policyholders



Non-Standard Auto – The Market







Comments

- Market is typically not profitable on a gross basis
 - Has not turned a pure u/w profit in last 12+ years
 - · Roughly breakeven over long-term, if fee income is considered
 - 2018-2020 are starting to make an adequate margin with fee income
- Companies are more leveraged on a gross basis and need more reinsurance
 - Loss of surplus from poor results
 - Growth in market (see below)
 - Premium increases

Comments

- The market is growing rapidly:
 - · Sensitive to changes in unemployment
 - NSA insureds are more likely to change driving mileage based on gas prices
 - Rate increases in market
- Growth in NSA vs standard auto part of increase in frequency trends for overall market
- Rates are rising rapidly in recent years

Comments and actions

- Adverse development is much more pronounced than standard market
- Inaccuracies likely stem from:
 - Reliance on rate increases to directly impact loss ratio
 - · Loss trend underestimated
 - · Optimistic business plans




Key Trends for Casualty

| Macro drivers | Impact | Comments |
|-------------------|--------|---|
| Reserve releases | | Reserve releases running out; adverse development for GL, Umbrella, Financial Lines, ? Workers Compensation |
| Rate trends | • • | Motor rates increases plateaued, WC rates decreasing, and Liability rates up/ momentum increasing |
| Economic activity | | The COVID lockdowns have led to an unprecedented drop in activity. Real GDP is projected to contract 6.4% in 2020 with only a partial rebound next year. The unemployment rate has spiked to post-Depression records and is not expected to reach pre-crisis lows over the forecast horizon |
| Yield curve | | Long tail lines extremely sensitive to investment income; yield curve movements impact profitability. Interest rates projected to remain low for even longer amid economic hit and unprecedented monetary policy actions |
| Health care costs | | As health care costs rise, claim costs increase, some PPACA provisions help keep medical inflation relatively low (vs. historical peaks) |
| Emerging Risks | | Marijuana, Autonomous Vehicles, 3D Printing, Pandemic, Climate change, Opioids, etc |
| Loss Trends | | Increasing severity due to property events, non-correlated, non-systemic large losses, deep pockets, motor impact on umbrella, temporary frequency reduction due to COVID impact on economy |



Trends: Current Auto Drivers Confidential














COVID-19: There are reports that severity is increasing because of more speeding on open roadways.


Although claim counts are down, it may not be for all types of claims

P&C Rate increases for US large and mid-size accounts still below year 2000 level The most exposed accounts are the least adequately priced





Health spending is a key indicator of Medical Cost Inflation Medical Inflation drives Bodily Injury loss severity



Comments & Actions

- PCE = Nominal dollar expenditures (price x quantity) on healthcare as measured by the Personal Consumption Expenditures component of Gross Domestic Product
- CMS = Nominal dollar expenditures on healthcare as measured by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
- The correlation between the two annual yoy series is 95.3% (1961-2018); on average, historic data shows health expenditure growth for PCE yoy is 0.2% higher than CMS estimates.
- The average CMS projection through 2027 is 5.6%.
- **KEY TAKEAWAY**
- After a decade (2001-2011) of declining Health spending levels, yoy growth has increased, partly driven by coverage expansion under ACA after 2014, BUT
- the projection of 5.6% is lower than the long term average

Source: Datastream and CMS



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What is Social Inflation?

- Defined by PLUS as capturing "an increased propensity to sue; rising jury awards and expanding judicial theories beyond the 4 corners of a contract."
- Rising costs of insurance claims resulting from:
- Anti-corporate sentiment
- Growing Wealth and Income gap
- Increased litigation
- Broader definitions of liability
- More plaintiff friendly legal decisions
- Composition of juries (millennials)
- Larger compensatory jury awards





Swiss Re's definition of social inflation

The term social inflation generally refers to the increase in compensation costs over and above basic economic trends. These include societal trends such as changing attitudes, expanding concepts of liability, a rising willingness to resolve conflict via the legal system, large defense costs, nuclear verdicts and a generally more plaintiff-friendly environment.



Nay sayers



Reserve deterioration will be 'huge issue' at Q4: Dowling

Bernard Goyder

16/01/2020

Analyst VJ Dowling has predicted that reserve deterioration will be dribbled out by carriers over coming quarters, rather than in a single lump, with negative consequences for insurance valuations.

Speaking at the Insurance Information Institute (III) Joint Industry Forum in New York, Dowling said: "We are going to start seeing a lot more stair-stepping of reserves," following years of optimistic reserving by carriers.

"It's not going to be good for the stocks if that happens," he added.

Reserve calculations are changing as a result of escalating social inflation, with jury awards surging.

Dowling said the increasing number of millennials on juries and the rise of litigation finance were pushing up claims costs. He said social inflation was a "big deal" for insurers in Q2 2019 and will become a "huge issue" during the upcoming Q4 results.

He said social inflation was being used as "an excuse" by companies to "hide from the fact we are going to get reversion to the mean with loss costs".

Since the financial crisis, casualty claims have come in lower than expected, but that trend has now firmly reversed, he explained.

Dowling added that the Sarbanes-Oxley rules make it hard for insurers to pile reserve deterioration into a single quarter, instead causing carriers to portion out reserve strengthening as bad news occurs.

Moreover, because actuaries base models on historical data, those responsible for reserving calculations can be slow to respond to changing circumstances.



Nay sayers

BUSINESS INSURANCE.

Group charges insurance sector with creating fake crisis

Posted On: Mar. 9, 2020 4:08 PM CST

Judy Greenwald

The insurance industry has created a "fake" crisis allegedly generated by high jury awards, although it is enjoying a record surplus, say two consumer organizations, in a report issued Monday.

Insurers have blamed <u>social inflation</u>, the term used to describe rising jury awards and settlements, as one of the principal drivers behind recent increases in insurance prices.



This "overcapitalized industry is already charging many businesses far too much in premiums while threatening even greater increases, all while attempting to create the perception that it is too financially troubled to pay clams," says the report How the Cash-Rich Insurance Industry Fakes Crises and Invents Social Inflation, which was issued by the Washington, D.C.-based Consumer Federation of America and the Center for Justice & Democracy at New York





HOW THE CASH-RICH INSURANCE INDUSTRY FAKES CRISES AND INVENTS SOCIAL INFLATION

Ву

J. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance, Consumer Federation of America

Joanne Doroshow, Executive Director, Center for Justice & Democracy


Douglas Heller, Insurance Expert, Consumer Federation of America

CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA CENTER FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY

March 2020



Claims Trend: Top 50 U.S. Verdicts 2014-2018



Comments

- Median of the top 50 single plaintiff bodily injury award has almost doubled from 2014 – 2018 due to increasing frequency of severe large losses
- Increase in "pile on litigation", once recalls/investigations are announced, more suits filed by municipalities, investors, consumers, etc.
- Juries desensitized to the value of a dollar and highly publicized mega verdicts are the new normal
- Millennials continue to take leadership roles in jury deliberations (studies indicate median awards from millennial juries are double prior historical awards)
- Juries discount facts on liability apportionment and are sympathetic to severely injured plaintiffs
- Plaintiff's bar very coordinated, share strategies rapidly & efficiently, and spending more on legal advertising and marketing than ever before
- · Reptile theory & Kardashian effect continue unabated
- Health Hazard & Medical device verdicts continue to drive the increasing awards
- The anti-corporation movement gained momentum after such scandals as Enron and the financial crisis of 2007-2008, juries take this bias to the courtroom
- Litigation funding has quadrupled between 2013 2016 increasing the volume of legal actions

Data compiled for AIG by Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin & Spratt

How did we get here?

Kardashian Effect

Celebrities and reality shows expose "normal" people to lavish wealth and upscale lifestyles.

Unrealistic expectations of earnings; unrealistic expectations for lost wages and/or damages.

If celebs/athletes make this much, why can't I?

No such thing as "gross wealth" to public anymore. *Juries are numb to the value of money*.

Reptile Theory

Plaintiff lawyers trigger survival-based thinking in juries to "protect" the individual and their community

Courtroom becomes a public forum to protect safety of all – the *public* is at risk

Safety should be primary concern and expectation that (large) companies should protect **every** citizen from harm

Juror views that large corporations are at fault for societal and environmental harms

Nuclear Verdicts

Juries continue to award damages even when the facts of the case prove that the defendant was not at fault

Huge verdicts can occur in rural areas that are economically depressed

Plaintiffs bar (1) focuses on defendants with the deepest pockets and (2) share tactics in order to maximize verdicts

Social Inflation

All three combine to allow juries to enact "social justice" with their findings.

We are starting to see verdicts that are legally inexplicable, but are setting case law for the future.

Defense attorneys must disrupt these verdicts by planning for, and disputing the gut instinct of juries.

It is no longer enough to disprove legal liability, defense attorneys must now disprove malicious intent.





What about the role of juries?

45% of jurors admit sympathy affects their attitudes about a lawsuit 42% of jurors
would decide a
case based not on
the law but on
what they believe
is fair


35% of jurors would add lawyer fees to a damages award, even if instructed not to


72% would assume a case has merit if it "makes it to a courtroom"

Millennial juries tend to be more socially conscious, sympathetic to injured plaintiffs, and significantly more likely to award damages and hold corporations to a higher standard than past generations.



Auto tort cases in state courts have strongly increased between 2014 and 2018







- Auto tort cases filed with US state courts have seen a significant uptick starting in 2014 (22% increase from 2014 to 2018)
- Medmal cases experienced a spike of 5.6% from 2017 to 2018 after having more moderately increased in the preceding years.

Source: Court Statistics Project http://www.courtstatistics.org/
State basis: 14 states with at least 6 years of reporting (2012 missing for some states) - AK/CT/IA/KS/MI/NE/NH/NJ/PA/PR/SC/TX/WA/WI



Shift from jury to bench trials in state courts





- We observe a shift from Jury trials to Bench trials for tort cases
- The shift is less pronounced for auto tort cases where still more cases end in jury trials than bench trials

Source: Court Statistics Project http://www.courtstatistics.org/

State basis (all tort): 16 states with at least 6 years of reporting (2012 missing for some states) – AK/FL/HI/KS/KY/MI/MN/MO/NV/NJ/NY/OH/SC/TX/WA State basis (auto tort): 16 states with at least 6 years of reporting (2012 missing for some states) – AK/FL/HI/IA/KS/MI/MN/NE/NV/NJ/NY/PR/SC/TX/WA/WI



Tort reform – little activity in recent years

Proportion of states having enacted ATRA supported reforms



- Hardly any ATRA-supported tort reform has been enacted since 2013 for class actions, punitive damages or product liability.
- To the contrary, several states have struck down punitive damage reforms as unconstitutional (Illinois, Kentucky and Missouri)

Source: American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) - http://www.atra.org/resources/tort-reform-records/
The graph shows the proportion of states that have enacted ATRA supported reforms since 1986. Reforms prior to 1986 are not tracked.



Trends: Key Trends we see for the Future

Confidential


















| Environmental Factors | Expected Impact | Comments |
|--|--------------------|---|
| Plaintiff attorney focus on motor and nuclear verdicts | • | Plaintiff's bar focus on traditional bodily injury. De-sensitized & anti-corporate juries are driving increase in large losses. Possibility Millennials will make up more of the juries the remainder of the year as older people stay home because of COVID-19. |
| Distracted Driving | → | Distracted Driving is expected to continue. However, smartphone penetration has little room to increase and vehicle cockpit innovations continue to be prevalent. This puts frequency at an elevated level, but not necessarily increasing anymore. |
| Telematics adoption & usage based insurance | | Poised for rapid growth in the U.S. Continued improvement in cost, convenience, and effectiveness. |
| Safety Innovation & Autonomous Vehicles | 1 | Accident avoidance systems common in new vehicles. AEB (automating emergency braking) targeted 100% by 2022. High autonomous vehicles expected in maybe a decade (not full autonomous). Average age of vehicle is increasing, new tech will trickle down to the population, delaying full benefits. |
| Ride Sharing | | Real-time algorithms are making this very efficient. Potential for multiple customers to the same destination. Implications are huge for less congestion, fewer drunk drivers, and less pollution. |
| Soaring repair costs | 1 | Safety innovations and increase in autonomous features are driving up cost to replace or repair vehicle. |
| Medical inflation | • | Strong increases in the cost of hospital services and prescription drugs. Same problems exist in healthcare with inefficiencies and utilization rather than prevention. As of Q4 2019, healthcare inflation was 5.3% (the average before the 08 collapse was 6%) |
| Marijuana | > | DC and 11 states legal for recreational use with more to come. Conflicting studies on whether frequency is increased permanently. |

COVID-19: Driving behavior may change forever. More acceptance of work from home. It might speed up the use of telematics and mileage based pricing.

Motor loss impact on Umbrella is Significant Top 200 Umbrella XOL losses (2010-2017)



40% (count) and 43% (total incurred) of our largest 200 Umbrella XOL losses are from Commercial Auto



Ultimate Loss Ratios - Industry Booked vs Projected

Commercial Auto Liability

| 09-19 E | xcl AmTrust | AmTrust Schedule P Industry Booked Ultimate Loss Ratios - Commercial Auto Liability | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|-----------------------------|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|--|
| Accident Year | Earned Premium (000s) | As of 12 | As of 24 | As of 36 | As of 48 | As of 60 | As of 72 | As of 84 | As of 96 | As of 108 | As of 120 | (Adv)/ Fav from 12 to Current |
| 1997 | 12,188,203 | 77.8% | 78.3% | 79.9% | 81.8% | 83.5% | 83.9% | 83.9% | 83.7% | 83.8% | 83.7% | -5.9% |
| 1998 | 12,093,751 | 77.0% | 78.7% | 81.8% | 85.2% | 86.4% | 86.8% | 86.5% | 86.4% | 86.1% | 86.1% | -9.1% |
| 1999 | 11,992,467 | 78.5% | 83.7% | 88.0% | 91.3% | 92.6% | 92.5% | 92.8% | 92.6% | 92.4% | 92.4% | -13.9% |
| 2000 | 12,870,674 | 77.3% | 80.8% | 84.2% | 86.6% | 88.0% | 88.9% | 88.6% | 88.5% | 88.5% | 88.4% | -11.1% |
| 2001 | 13,900,917 | 73.3% | 73.2% | 75.7% | 77.6% | 78.7% | 78.2% | 77.9% | 77.9% | 77.6% | 77.5% | -4.2% |
| 2002 | 15,724,627 | 66.6% | 64.9% | 66.4% | 66.9% | 66.9% | 66.8% | 66.4% | 66.3% | 66.1% | 66.0% | 0.6% |
| 2003 | 17,429,980 | 63.6% | 61.5% | 61.1% | 61.2% | 60.8% | 60.5% | 60.2% | 59.9% | 59.8% | 59.7% | 3.9% |
| 2004 | 18,711,968 | 61.5% | 58.6% | 58.2% | 57.9% | 57.3% | 57.4% | 56.9% | 56.8% | 56.7% | 56.7% | 4.9% |
| 2005 | 19,121,586 | 60.8% | 59.1% | 58.3% | 58.2% | 57.8% | 57.5% | 57.1% | 57.0% | 56.8% | 56.7% | 4.1% |
| 2006 | 19,041,946 | 61.6% | 59.8% | 59.2% | 58.9% | 58.3% | 57.8% | 57.8% | 57.7% | 57.5% | 57.5% | 4.1% |
| 2007 | 18,899,073 | 61.9% | 61.1% | 60.9% | 60.7% | 60.1% | 60.2% | 60.0% | 59.9% | 59.8% | 59.7% | 2.2% |
| 2008 | 17,884,154 | 62.4% | 61.4% | 61.3% | 61.0% | 61.0% | 60.9% | 60.9% | 60.8% | 60.8% | 60.7% | 1.7% |
| 2009 | 16,739,915 | 62.7% | 60.5% | 60.4% | 60.1% | 60.2% | 60.0% | 59.9% | 59.7% | 59.7% | 59.7% | 2.9% |
| 2010 | 15,864,610 | 64.7% | 64.9% | 65.9% | 66.8% | 67.5% | 67.7% | 67.5% | 67.3% | 67.3% | 67.4% | -2.6% |
| 2011 | 15,941,869 | 65.6% | 68.3% | 70.0% | 71.0% | 72.4% | 72.5% | 72.4% | 72.5% | 72.6% | | -7.0% |
| 2012 | 16,339,409 | 66.2% | 68.2% | 69.6% | 71.7% | 72.5% | 72.6% | 72.6% | 72.6% | | | -6.5% |
| 2013 | 17,459,867 | 65.6% | 67.2% | 70.6% | 72.7% | 73.5% | 73.5% | 73.9% | | | | -8.2% |
| 2014 | 18,552,623 | 65.3% | 68.5% | 71.6% | 73.2% | 74.5% | 74.8% | | | | | -9.5% |
| 2015 | 19,803,697 | 66.2% | 70.0% | 72.8% | 74.7% | 76.0% | | | | | | -9.8% |
| 2016 | 20,443,983 | 69.3% | 72.2% | 75.2% | 77.9% | | | | | | | -8.6% |
| 2017 | 21,430,109 | 70.7% | 72.9% | 76.2% | | | | | | | | -5.5% |
| 2018 | 24,863,191 | 69.7% | 72.8% | | | | | | | | | -3.2% |
| 2019 | 27,680,318 | 70.9% | | | | | | | | | | |

| | Swiss Re Actuarial Projections | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|----------|-----------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Reported Loss Ratio | Paid Method | Reported Method | Selected | Carried - Selected | | | | | | | |

- Since AY 2010, industry booked loss ratios are higher than the initial projection as of 12 months.
- Every AY year from 2010 to 2018 had adverse devt. in CY 2019.
- 2018 Premium level increase is due in part to US tax reform (less intragroup, offshore cessions)
- Premium levels in 2019 are up 11%.
 Even so, early chain ladder indications point to adverse development.

| 67.1% | 67.4% | 67.4% | 67.4% | 0.0% |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 72.1% | 72.6% | 72.6% | 72.6% | 0.0% |
| 71.9% | 72.6% | 72.6% | 72.6% | 0.0% |
| 73.0% | 73.9% | 73.9% | 73.9% | 0.0% |
| 73.5% | 75.2% | 75.2% | 75.2% | -0.4% |
| 74.0% | 76.8% | 76.9% | 76.8% | -0.8% |
| 73.0% | 79.5% | 79.6% | 79.5% | -1.6% |
| 66.6% | 79.9% | 80.0% | 80.0% | -3.8% |
| 54.6% | 78.1% | 78.4% | 78.2% | -5.4% |
| 37.1% | 73.4% | 77.2% | 75.3% | -4.4% |

Loss Ratio for Combined Ratio of 100 = 64.6%

Δ vs 12 <-5.0% <-3.8% <-2.5% <-1.3% >1.3% >2.5% >3.8% >5.0%

2010-2019 Total Ind Reserves 38,367,910 2010-2019 Reserve Red/ (Def) (3,954,249) 2010-2018 Prior Yr Devt (2,473,006)



Ultimate Loss Ratios – Industry Booked vs Projected Personal Auto Liability

| | | | Schedule P Ultimate Loss Ratio Selections - Private Passenger Auto Liability | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|--------------------------|----------|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-------------------------------------|
| Accident Year | Earned Premium (000s) | As of 12 | As of 24 | As of 36 | As of 48 | As of 60 | As of 72 | As of 84 | As of 96 | As of 108 | As of 120 | (Adv)/ Fav from 12 to Current |
| 1997 | 68,239,065 | 72.9% | 70.4% | 69.5% | 69.1% | 68.9% | 68.8% | 68.8% | 68.8% | 68.8% | 68.8% | 4.1% |
| 1998 | 68,901,300 | 71.5% | 70.3% | 70.1% | 69.8% | 69.8% | 69.8% | 69.8% | 69.7% | 69.8% | 69.8% | 1.7% |
| 1999 | 68,836,544 | 75.0% | 74.9% | 74.8% | 74.9% | 74.8% | 74.8% | 74.8% | 74.9% | 74.8% | 74.8% | 0.2% |
| 2000 | 69,147,087 | 79.0% | 79.4% | 79.6% | 79.7% | 79.7% | 79.8% | 79.8% | 79.8% | 79.9% | 79.9% | -0.9% |
| 2001 | 72,567,709 | 78.4% | 78.0% | 77.8% | 77.9% | 78.1% | 78.0% | 78.0% | 78.0% | 78.0% | 78.0% | 0.4% |
| 2002 | 79,248,275 | 76.0% | 75.1% | 74.7% | 74.8% | 74.7% | 74.6% | 74.5% | 74.5% | 74.5% | 74.5% | 1.5% |
| 2003 | 86,800,351 | 71.0% | 68.7% | 67.8% | 67.6% | 67.4% | 67.4% | 67.3% | 67.2% | 67.2% | 67.2% | 3.9% |
| 2004 | 91,906,472 | 67.8% | 65.2% | 64.3% | 63.9% | 63.6% | 63.5% | 63.5% | 63.4% | 63.4% | 63.4% | 4.4% |
| 2005 | 94,278,316 | 67.1% | 64.8% | 64.1% | 63.8% | 63.5% | 63.4% | 63.2% | 63.2% | 63.2% | 63.2% | 3.9% |
| 2006 | 95,333,340 | 65.8% | 65.0% | 64.5% | 64.1% | 63.7% | 63.5% | 63.5% | 63.4% | 63.4% | 63.4% | 2.4% |
| 2007 | 94,735,725 | 68.8% | 68.4% | 67.9% | 67.5% | 67.1% | 66.9% | 66.9% | 66.8% | 66.8% | 66.8% | 2.0% |
| 2008 | 93,293,839 | 69.4% | 68.8% | 68.1% | 67.6% | 67.3% | 67.2% | 67.1% | 67.1% | 67.1% | 67.1% | 2.3% |
| 2009 | 93,336,052 | 72.9% | 72.0% | 71.2% | 70.7% | 70.4% | 70.5% | 70.5% | 70.4% | 70.4% | 70.4% | 2.5% |
| 2010 | 95,292,721 | 73.5% | 72.4% | 71.6% | 71.5% | 71.3% | 71.4% | 71.3% | 71.2% | 71.2% | 71.2% | 2.3% |
| 2011 | 98,157,391 | 72.1% | 70.8% | 70.7% | 70.7% | 70.6% | 70.5% | 70.5% | 70.5% | 70.5% | | 1.6% |
| 2012 | 100,636,845 | 71.5% | 70.8% | 70.7% | 70.6% | 70.5% | 70.4% | 70.4% | 70.4% | | | 1.1% |
| 2013 | 101,545,356 | 72.5% | 72.3% | 72.4% | 72.5% | 72.3% | 72.2% | 72.2% | | | | 0.2% |
| 2014 | 116,823,393 | 65.8% | 66.1% | 66.4% | 66.4% | 66.2% | 66.1% | | | | _ | -0.3% |
| 2015 | 114,209,842 | 72.9% | 74.5% | 75.0% | 75.1% | 75.1% | | | | | | -2.2% |
| 2016 | 121,334,359 | 75.1% | 75.7% | 76.0% | 76.1% | | | | | | | -1.1% |
| 2017 | 130,585,644 | 72.3% | 71.7% | 71.8% | | | | | | | | 0.5% |
| 2018 | 141,446,071 | 69.4% | 69.2% | | | | | | | | | 0.3% |
| 2019 | 146,164,596 | 70.4% | | | | | | | | | | |

Loss Ratio for Combined Ratio of 100 =

Δ **vs 12** < -5.0% < -3.8% < -2.5% < -1.3%

64.6%

> 1.3%

> 2.5%

> 3.8%

> 5.0%

| Actuarial Projections | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Reported Carried - Paid Method Method Selected Selected | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Since AY 2012, Industry booked loss ratios are not consistently higher than | | | | | | | | | | | |

- the initial projection as of 12 months.
- Every AY year from 2010 to 2018 exhibits only modest development in CY 2019.
- 2018 Premium level increase is due in part to US tax reform (less intragroup, offshore cessions)
- Premium levels in 2019 are up 3%.

| 71.3% | 71.3% | 71.3% | -0.1% |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 70.5% | 70.5% | 70.5% | 0.0% |
| 70.4% | 70.4% | 70.4% | 0.0% |
| 72.3% | 72.2% | 72.3% | 0.0% |
| 66.2% | 66.1% | 66.2% | 0.0% |
| 75.4% | 75.1% | 75.2% | -0.2% |
| 76.6% | 76.1% | 76.3% | -0.2% |
| 71.9% | 71.4% | 71.7% | 0.1% |
| 68.8% | 68.4% | 68.6% | 0.6% |
| 68.9% | 69.2% | 69.1% | 1.3% |

2010-19 Reserve Redundancy/ (Deficiency) = 2,111,694



Ultimate Loss Ratios – Industry Booked vs Projected

Other Liability Occurrence – (Mostly Excludes Professional and D&O)

| 09-19 E | ccl AmTrust | Schedule P Industry Booked Ultimate Loss Ratios - Other Liability: Occurrence | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|-----------------------------|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|--|
| Accident Year | Earned Premium (000s) | As of 12 | As of 24 | As of 36 | As of 48 | As of 60 | As of 72 | As of 84 | As of 96 | As of 108 | As of 120 | (Adv)/ Fav from 12 to Current |
| 1997 | 12,399,909 | 80.9% | 81.5% | 82.5% | 81.1% | 82.0% | 83.8% | 83.3% | 84.7% | 86.3% | 87.5% | -6.6% |
| 1998 | 13,182,174 | 82.3% | 83.0% | 85.6% | 88.5% | 91.6% | 91.2% | 95.3% | 97.9% | 98.7% | 99.0% | -16.7% |
| 1999 | 12,278,962 | 79.1% | 81.0% | 82.8% | 89.0% | 91.7% | 95.5% | 99.9% | 101.9% | 101.9% | 105.4% | -26.2% |
| 2000 | 12,308,791 | 79.2% | 79.6% | 84.2% | 90.2% | 96.4% | 98.2% | 99.0% | 100.3% | 100.6% | 101.0% | -21.8% |
| 2001 | 12,969,558 | 89.4% | 91.0% | 91.6% | 94.7% | 98.7% | 100.7% | 102.1% | 101.5% | 102.2% | 102.8% | -13.4% |
| 2002 | 17,331,029 | 72.1% | 71.8% | 73.9% | 77.0% | 78.5% | 79.0% | 79.1% | 79.6% | 80.3% | 80.8% | -8.7% |
| 2003 | 22,093,965 | 69.3% | 66.3% | 66.1% | 65.2% | 63.6% | 62.9% | 62.9% | 63.1% | 62.7% | 62.3% | 7.0% |
| 2004 | 25,655,794 | 68.3% | 60.8% | 57.9% | 55.9% | 54.8% | 54.6% | 53.9% | 53.4% | 52.9% | 52.9% | 15.4% |
| 2005 | 25,637,314 | 65.5% | 61.5% | 59.6% | 56.6% | 55.9% | 54.8% | 53.9% | 53.5% | 53.2% | 53.6% | 11.9% |
| 2006 | 28,381,175 | 63.9% | 61.9% | 58.6% | 57.1% | 56.1% | 54.5% | 53.9% | 52.8% | 52.3% | 52.2% | 11.7% |
| 2007 | 28,083,816 | 66.1% | 63.7% | 61.9% | 61.9% | 60.3% | 60.0% | 58.6% | 57.8% | 57.5% | 57.2% | 8.9% |
| 2008 | 26,287,610 | 67.3% | 65.6% | 65.5% | 62.8% | 62.5% | 61.6% | 60.8% | 60.0% | 59.7% | 59.6% | 7.6% |
| 2009 | 24,817,098 | 69.1% | 68.4% | 66.2% | 63.9% | 63.0% | 61.8% | 61.0% | 61.3% | 60.5% | 60.4% | 8.7% |
| 2010 | 23,159,755 | 68.4% | 68.0% | 67.9% | 66.4% | 66.0% | 65.3% | 65.3% | 64.5% | 64.4% | 64.5% | 3.9% |
| 2011 | 22,944,250 | 67.0% | 67.0% | 67.2% | 67.0% | 66.9% | 67.2% | 66.6% | 66.4% | 66.8% | | 0.2% |
| 2012 | 24,094,289 | 64.8% | 64.7% | 64.1% | 64.6% | 64.5% | 64.9% | 64.4% | 64.5% | | | 0.3% |
| 2013 | 25,852,430 | 62.3% | 61.7% | 62.4% | 63.7% | 63.4% | 63.4% | 63.7% | | | | -1.4% |
| 2014 | 28,100,614 | 61.7% | 61.1% | 62.8% | 62.0% | 62.8% | 64.2% | | | | | -2.5% |
| 2015 | 28,946,170 | 61.6% | 63.6% | 63.1% | 64.2% | 66.7% | | | | | | -5.1% |
| 2016 | 29,186,378 | 63.7% | 64.1% | 65.0% | 66.7% | | | | | | | -3.0% |
| 2017 | 29,601,342 | 63.3% | 64.9% | 67.0% | | | | | | | | -3.7% |
| 2018 | 35,764,839 | 64.4% | 65.6% | | | | | | | | | -1.1% |
| 2019 | 38,037,782 | 66.5% | | | | | | | | | | |

| | Swis | Swiss Re Actuarial Projections | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|----------------|--------------------------------|----------|-----------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Reported Loss Ratio | Paid Method | Reported Method | Selected | Carried - Selected | | | | | | | | |

- Since AY 2013, Industry booked loss ratios are higher than the initial projection as of 12 months.
- Every AY year from 2010 to 2018 had adverse devt. in CY 2019.
- 2018 Premium level increase is due in part to US tax reform (less intragroup, offshore cessions)
- Premium levels in 2019 are up 6%.
 Even so early chain ladder indications show adverse development.

| 60.6% | 64.5% | 64.5% | 64.5% | 0.0% |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 62.0% | 66.8% | 66.8% | 66.8% | 0.0% |
| 58.8% | 64.6% | 64.5% | 64.5% | 0.0% |
| 57.5% | 64.7% | 64.4% | 64.4% | -0.7% |
| 55.7% | 66.7% | 65.1% | 65.1% | -0.9% |
| 55.7% | 72.3% | 70.2% | 71.3% | -4.5% |
| 48.5% | 70.2% | 69.3% | 69.7% | -3.1% |
| 40.7% | 69.9% | 72.5% | 71.2% | -4.2% |
| 28.0% | 74.1% | 70.3% | 72.2% | -6.7% |
| 15.1% | 85.0% | 75.4% | 75.4% | -8.8% |

| Loss Ratio for Combined Ratio of 100 = | | | | | 62.3% | | | |
|--|---------|---------|---------|--|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| ∆ vs 12 < -5.0% | < -3.8% | < -2.5% | < -1.3% | | > 1.3% | > 2.5% | > 3.8% | > 5.0% |


Heat Map range (input) +/-: 5%

2010-2019 Total Ind Reserves 79,073,926 2010-2019 Reserve Red/ (Def) (9,632,014) 2010-2018 Prior Yr Devt (2,821,666)




COVID-19: Frustrating or ameliorating social inflation?

- Most experts predict same or increased levels of social inflation
- Why?
- Frustration with large corporations not taking 'adequate' precautions on behalf of employees
- Blending frustration with government actions with corporations: reducing workforce, employment, 'little man' loses
- Frustration and increased sense of fear, lack of control, powerlessness, identification with victim mentality, finding villains






What about the Court System during COVID-19




What about the Court System during COVID-19






COVID-19 Impact on Mileage





COVID-19 Impact on Passenger Travel – INRIX Data





COVID-19 Early Impact on Severity

Fatalities per mile driven +14% in March

Average speeds on congested roads increased up to 250%

Speeding increased 27%

Hard braking up 25%

Phone usage soared 38%








COVID-19 Analysis





Commercial Auto Liability – Incremental Average Premium Changes



Company Quarter Rate Change Current Policy Current Previous **Previous Previous Premiums** Average of Date Incremental PY Group Count Premium **Policy Count** Premium (Adjusted) **Premium** Total 2008 Q1 -8.5% 2,278,074 1,422,144,703 1,539,105,926 1,553,516,058 2,256,943 624 2008 Q2 -9.2% Total 2,321,732 1,481,680,471 2,309,684 1,624,074,448 1,632,546,104 638 Total 2008 Q3 -6.5% 2,359,416 1,435,468,282 2,346,270 1,526,731,486 1,535,285,664 608 Total 2008 Q4 -5.8% 2,077,161 1,217,889,146 2,111,258 1,314,207,063 1,292,982,504 586


Illustrative


Source: ISO Monday Webinar Series – Reserve Runoffs and Distorted Analytics - 8/31/2020; using ISO MarketWatch Expanded and Dashboard – released July 2020





Sample Average Premium Reductions in the Great Recession

Illustrative











Source: ISO MarketWatch Expanded - released 12/2019


Prior Shock Events Analysis – Great Recession



Analyzing Premium Declines - Sample Reductions and Shapes by LOB/Market - CAu







Source: ISO MarketWatch Dashboard (removal of floors / ceilings) - Method 2 Parallel lines mark start (12/1/2007) to end (6/1/2009) of the Great Recession

Source: ISO MarketWatch - released 12/2019

Prior Shock Events Analysis – Great Recession



Analyzing Premium Declines – Summary by LOB/Market

Illustrative

| | | | Dates | | | Drop/Reco | very Metrics | |
|-----------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|---------------|------------|--------------|-------------|
| ISO MarketWatch | Initial | | GR Start to | Trough to | Additional to | Drop to | Total Drop | Total |
| LOB/Market | Premium Drop | Trough | Trough | Flat (0%) | Full Rebound | Trough | to Flat | Premium (B) |
| GL-Contractors | 12/1/2006 | 3/1/2008 | 3 Months | 27 Months | 24 Months | -16.6% | -36.7% | 16.8 |
| GL-Completed Ops | 2/1/2007 | 1/1/2009 | 13 Months | 15 Months | 16 Months | -18.0% | -25.7% | 7.6 |
| GL-Manufacturers | 11/1/2006 | 12/1/2008 | 12 Months | 22 Months | 14 Months | -14.5% | -23.1% | 5.6 |
| CRR - GL+CAu | 4/1/2008 | 2/1/2009 | 14 Months | 17 Months | 10 Months | -10.5% | -13.3% | 33.3 |
| D&O | 7/1/2006 | 11/1/2009 | 23 Months | 10 Months | 21 Months | -40.4% | -45.6% | 15.2 |
| D&O For Profit | 4/1/200 | 11/1/2009 | 23 Months | 10 Months | 25 Months | -50.5% | -55.1% | 13.2 |
| CAu-TTT | 11/1/2006 | 9/1/2009 | 21 Months | 13 Months | 2 Months | -17.5% | -23.0% | 37.0 |
| CAu-Misc | 4/1/2007 | 6/1/2008 | 6 Months | 29 Months | 11 Months | -34.6% | -48.7% | 10.0 |
| ВОР | 5/1/2006 | 1/1/2010 | 25 Months | 9 Months | 13 Months | -19.7% | -20.1% | 36.6 |
| BOP-Indiv Prem Cont | 2/1/2007 | 8/1/2010 | 31 Months | 4 Months | 66 Months | -16.4% | -19.4% | 6.8 |
| BOP-Liability Payroll | 2/1/2006 | 12/1/2008 | 12 Months | 24 Months | 24 Months | -14.5% | -24.7% | 2.1 |
| Comm'l Inland Marine | 6/1/2007 | 8/1/2009 | 20 Months | 11 Months | 18 Months | -33.8% | -38.3% | 42.4 |
| Average Reviewed (12) | 4/1/2007 | 2/1/2009 | 14 Months | 19 Months | 13 Months | -15.3% | -25.4% | 204.5 |
| LOB Weighted Average | 2/8/2007 | 5/25/2009 | 17 Months | 14 Months | 13 Months | -22.5% | -28.2% | 7 |
| | Cumulative from | m start GR: | 17 Months | 32 Months | 45 Months | r Alloy V. | | |
| Dow Jones | 10/1/2007 | 2/1/2009 | 14 Months | 15 Months | 32 Months | -49.3% | | |
| Unemployment | 3/1/2007 | 11/1/2009 | 23 Months | 43 Months | 43 Months | 110.6% | | |
| Housing Prices | 1/1/2007 | 1/1/2009 | 13 Months | 34 Months | 13 Months | -20.2% | | |
| | Start | End | | | | | | |
| Great Recession Dates | 12/1/2007 | 6/1/2009 | | | | | | |

Note: Great Recession defined as the time period from December 2007 to June 2009, starting with the crash of the housing market and ending when the stimulus packages were passed

Leading Indicators of treasury yields, consumer confidence, housing prices, and building permits all

indicated that the economy was declining at least a year before the official start of the recession.

Initial premium drop date is when total collected premium per policy started declining

Full rebound to cover loss trend = 3-4%

Dow Jones went from 13,930 to 7,063; Unemployment went from 4.4% to 10.0%;

Housing Prices went from \$320,100 to \$257,000

Recovery metrics estimated using monthly impacts from annual rolled up MWDB (area between x-axis and pricing curve)


Total Markets Analyzed above (12 of 72) represents about 25% of the total premium (855.2B) analyzed during that period

Source: ISO MarketWatch



Summary of Lags between initial Premium Drops to Recovery

Illustrative



Source: MarketWatch Dashboard (v1.5 2020-02)



Covid – Market Impact / LDF Speed Up / Slow Down Impact Framework

Illustrative

| | | Da | tes | | Drop/Reco | very Metrics | |
|-----------------------|--------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|-------------|
| ISO MarketWatch | Initial | | GR Start to | Trough to | Drop to | Total Drop | Total |
| LOB/Market | Premium Drop | Trough | Trough | Flat (0%) | Trough | to Flat | Premium (B) |
| GL-Contractors | 12/1/2006 | 3/1/2008 | 3 Months | 27 Months | -16.6% | -36.7% | 16.8 |
| GL-Completed Ops | 2/1/2007 | 1/1/2009 | 13 Months | 15 Months | -18.0% | -25.7% | 7.6 |
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| D&O For Profit | 4/1/2006 | 11/1/2009 | 23 Months | 10 Months | -50.5% | -55.1% | 13.2 |
| CAu-TTT | 11/1/2006 | 9/1/2009 | 21 Months | 13 Months | -17.5% | -23.0% | 37.0 |
| CAu-Misc | 4/1/2007 | 6/1/2008 | 6 Months | 29 Months | -34.6% | -48.7% | 10.0 |
| ВОР | 5/1/2006 | 1/1/2010 | 25 Months | 9 Months | -19.7% | -20.1% | 36.6 |
| BOP-Indiv Prem Cont | 2/1/2007 | 8/1/2010 | 31 Months | 4 Months | -16.4% | -19.4% | 6.8 |
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| Average Reviewed (12) | 4/1/2007 | 2/1/2009 | 14 Months | 19 Months | -15.3% | -25.4% | 204.5 |
| LOB Weighted Average | 2/8/2007 | 5/25/2009 | 17 Months | 14 Months | -22.5% | -28.2% | |

| Covid-19: Dat | es Medium Scenario | Drop/Recove | ry Expectation |
|---------------|--------------------|-------------|----------------|
| | Partial Rebound to | Drop to | Total Drop |
| Trough | Flat | Trough | to Flat |
| | | | |
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Cumulative from start GR: 17 Months 32 Months

| Dow Jones | 10/1/2007 | 2/1/2009 | 14 Months | 15 Months | -49.3% |
|----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|
| Unemployment | 3/1/2007 | 11/1/2009 | 23 Months | 43 Months | 110.6% |
| Housing Prices | 1/1/2007 | 1/1/2009 | 13 Months | 34 Months | -20.2% |
| | Start | End | | | |

Covid 19 Assumption: Medium Scenario (single big wave end 6/30/2020)

Source: ISO MarketWatch - released 12/2019

12/1/2007

Covid extension will involve judgments under various viral scenarios as to depth, duration, and shape (V, U, W, WW, L, extended L,...)

Great Recession Dates


Covid Actuarial Analysis




New Covid case reproduction number by state and shelter order – base case (5/4/2020) Illustrative

These exhibits show the last 7-day and 3-day cases by state and shelter order, as well as Rt, the effective reproduction number. States are split between those who are sheltered, vs. reopened, vs. never sheltered as of 5/4/2020. The top exhibit displays raw new cases, while the bottom adjusts the cases to per million per capita.

Reviewing these periodically will help show the effect of the reopening orders. Other factors such as amount of testing and testing quality would need to be considered.





Source: compiled by ISO using data from https://rt.live/

Covid Actuarial Analysis




New Covid case and testing counts by shelter order – base week (@5/4/2020)

Illustrative

These exhibits show the number of new Covid-19 cases and tests split between NY/NJ and the rest of the country by shelter order as of 5/4/2020. Significant different case trends can be partially explained by different test trends.


Reviewing these periodically will help show the effect of the reopening orders. Other factors such as testing quality, types of tests, changes in case and test reporting methods by state, would need to be considered.

| 14-day Trend | 4/21-5/4 | | 5/4 | | |
|------------------|---------------------|-------|--------------------|-------------|--|
| (Expon) | New Cases New Tests | | Total Cases | Total Tests | |
| cw | -4.8% | 45.2% | 1,171,381 | 7,268,378 | |
| NY/NJ | -36.8% | 24.4% | 447,222 | 1,284,530 | |
| CW xNY/NJ | 12.6% | 49.4% | 724,159 | 5,983,848 | |
| Sheltered xNY/NJ | 6.2% | 41.1% | 565,718 | 4,322,311 | |
| Reopened | 28.3% | 88.6% | 125,530 | 1,263,750 | |
| Never Sheltered | 68.7% | 30.6% | 32,911 | 397,787 | |



Reopened Never Sheltered

3/22



Source: compiled by ISO using data from The COVID Tracking Project (https://covidtracking.com/api


Sheltered xNY/NJ

Covid Actuarial Analysis



New Covid case and testing counts by reopen status (@7/27/2020)

Illustrative



| 14-day Trend | 7/14 | -7/27 | 7/. | 27 |
|--------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| (Expon) | New Cases | New Tests | Total Cases | Total Tests |
| Reopened | 26.3% | 13.3% | 570,537 | 8,387,146 |
| Reopening | 14.0% | 10.0% | 1,176,842 | 15,098,652 |
| Pausing | 9.1% | 11.6% | 764,282 | 8,944,473 |
| Reversing | -1.5% | 7.4% | 1,747,346 | 19,458,986 |

These exhibits show the number of new Covid-19 cases and tests by reopen status as of 7/27/2020. Significant different case trends can be partially explained by different test trends.

Reviewing these periodically will help show the effect of the reopening orders. Other factors such as testing quality, types of tests, changes in case and test reporting methods by state, would need to be considered.

Source: compiled by ISO using data from The COVID Tracking Project (https://covidtracking.com/api

Covid Actuarial Analysis: Standard Testing Issues (using Bayes Theorem)



A standard disease testing problem is inaccuracy in the tests and testing procedure used to determine policy. All designed tests strive to reduce the occurrence of what are called False Positives or False Negatives. This issue is not just related to COVID-19, but to assessing most other diseases (problem addressed by Bayes theorem).

To illustrate this testing issue, can see this Figure. The goal is to determine if a test comes back positive, what is the chance they are actually sick with the disease? Or vice-versa. For a disease that is relatively prevalent in the population (top illustrative scenario if NYC at 20% with sensitivity 94% and specificity 99% factors), a standard test will be relatively accurate at 96% PPV. On the other hand, if the population prevalence factor is much rarer (say 1%, or 5%), the PPV drops to only 49% and 83% respectively.

Given those low results, resources would be expended to try to improve the accuracy of the tests for varying populations. With COVID-19, the disease will typically go from rare to highly prevalent and move back to rare.

Illustrative

Test Q: If test comes back positive, what is chance they are actually sick?

Hospital in NYC (Illustrative) - prevalence 20%

| 20.00/ | | | | % Test Result | |
|--------|----------|--------------|--------|---------------|-----|
| 20.0% | Diseased | Not Diseased | Total | Accurate | |
| Test + | 1,880 | 80 | 1,960 | 95.9% | PPV |
| Test - | 120 | 7,920 | 8,040 | 98.5% | NPV |
| Total | 2.000 | 8.000 | 10.000 | | |

Alternative population - prevalence 1%

| 1.0% | | | | % Test Result | 4 |
|--------|----------|--------------|--------|---------------|-----|
| 1.0% | Diseased | Not Diseased | Total | Accurate | |
| Test + | 94 | 99 | 193 | 48.7% | PPV |
| Test - | 6 | 9,801 | 9,807 | 99.9% | NPV |
| Total | 100 | 9.900 | 10.000 | | |

Alternative population - prevalence 5%

| 5.0% | | | | % Test Result | |
|--------|----------|--------------|--------|---------------|-----|
| 3.0% | Diseased | Not Diseased | Total | Accurate | |
| Test + | 470 | 95 | 565 | 83.2% | PPV |
| Test - | 30 | 9,405 | 9,435 | 99.7% | NPV |
| Total | 500 | 9,500 | 10,000 | | |

Assumptions: 10,000 people in population, X% population infected (20%, 1%, 5%)

| Sensitivity | Specificity |
|-------------|-------------|
| 0.94 | 0.99 |

Sensitivity = the probability of a positive test result if diseased.

Specificity = the probability of a negative test result if not diseased.

PPV (positive predictive value) = the probability that a positive test result is a true positive.

NPV (negative predictive value) = the probability that a negative test result is a true negative.

Source (6/11/2020): https://www.verisk.com/insurance/covid-19/iso-insights/information-emergence-lag-and-wrong-signaling-going-viral/

Insurance vs. Pandemic Projection Analysis



| | Insurance | Pandemic |
|---|--|---|
| • | exposures (e.g. automobiles, houses, or hospital policies) | a set of individuals are exposed to the virus (with cohorts that allow for skillful estimations) a certain portion of those individuals will be tested, |
| • | accidents or losses will then occur on a certain portion of those policies | either because they were concerned they were symptomatic , or because of testing guidelines |
| • | may take time to be reported to the insurance carrier (some types of policies can take months or even years to discover there were losses). | suggesting they should be some of those individuals will test positive and either try to ride it out at home, not wanting to overcrowd the hospitals or risk further exposure, or go to the hospital if more severe |
| • | legal proceedings often also taking months or years a certain portion of these claims will then be closed without payment, while others will have settlements | after being screened at the ER, depending upon the severity of the cases will then perhaps go to the ICU or intubated |
| | made to either the insured or to those who suffered the losses. | ultimate resolution of the cases will depend on many factors, but patients could be in this stage for many weeks, and ultimately will either gave full recovery, permanent issues ("long haulers") or suffer a fatality |

Source: ISO Actuarial Panel September 2, 2020


Covid Actuarial Analysis – Using Triangles



Conceptual Framework of Tracking Covid Exposure through to Hospitalizations and Fatalities

Illustrative

These exhibits show how actuarial science can be used to help analyze the various Covid stages. Conceptually, if the right kind of linked data was captured, the process from initial exposure and positive cases through to recovery or death could be tracked. E.g. with robust exposure identification and contact tracing, all those exposed in say the 1st week of April, could be tracked through testing, positive cases, hospitalizations, ICU admissions, intubations and eventual either recovery or death. That process and statistics, which can take weeks or even months, can be used to estimate later cohorts via standard actuarial triangle procedures. Scenario testing, such as shelter policy, can then be tested.



| | A. Exposure | # Tests | | All Historica | I data and se | lections comple | tely illustra | tive | |
|----------------------------|---|--|---|---|---|--|--|-----------|--|
| Exposures | Week end | 7 | 14 | 21 | 28 | 35 | 42 | 49 | ult |
| 10,100,000 | 3/31/2020&P | 607,117 | 1,113,048 | 1,517,793 | 1,821,352 | 1,963,013 | 2,023,724 | 2,023,724 | 2,023,724 |
| 7,200,000 | 4/7/2020 | 433,655 | 795,035 | 1,084,138 | 1,300,966 | 1,402,152 | 1.445.517 | | 1,445,517 |
| 6,700,000 | 4/14/2020 | 432,165 | 792,303 | 1,080,413 | 1,296,495 | 1,397,334 | | | 1,440,550 |
| 6,300,000 | 4/21/2020 | 449,717 | 824,480 | 1,124,291 | 1,349,150 | | | | 1,499,055 |
| 5,800,000 | 4/28/2020 | 520,386 | 954,042 | 1,300,966 | | | | | 1,734,621 |
| 5,300,000 | 5/5/2020 | 683,336 | 1,252,782 | | | | | | 2,277,785 |
| 4,800,000 | 5/12/2020 | 867,310 | | Upward tren | | | | | 2,891,035 |
| | Maturity | @4/14/2020 | @4/21/2020 | @4/28/2020 | @5/5/2020 | @5/12/2020 | | | |
| | #Tests - CTP | 3,124,711 | 4,180,281 55.0% | 5,795,126 75.0% | 7,543,181 90.0% | 9,636,783 | 20.0% | 100.0% | 13,312,288 |
| | B. Test Dates | # Positive Ca | | 75.0% | 90.0% | 97.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 10.7 |
| | | | | | - | | - 12 | | 25 |
| # Tests | Week end | 7 | 14 | 21 | 28 | 35 | 42 | 49 | ult |
| 2,023,724 | 3/31/2020&P | 190,483 | 226,198 | 238,103 | 238,103 | 238,103 | 238,103 | 238,103 | 238,103 |
| 1,445,517 | 4/7/2020 | 174,156 | 206,810 | 217,695 | 217,695 | 217,695 | 217,695 | | 217,695 |
| 1,440,550 1,499,055 | 4/14/2020 | 168,713 163,271 | 200,347 193,884 | 210,892 204,089 | 210,892 204,089 | 210,892 | | | 210,892 204,089 |
| | 4/21/2020 | | | 183,680 | 204,089 | | | | |
| 1,734,621 2,277,785 | 4/28/2020 5/5/2020 | 146,944 143,220 | 174,496 170.074 | 183,680 | | | | | 183,680 179,025 |
| | | 136,059 | 170,074 | 0 | | ial distancing worl | Maria de la compansión de | | 179,025 |
| 2,891,035 | 5/12/2020 | | | | | | king after lag | | 170,074 |
| | Maturity | @4/14/2020 | @4/21/2020 | @4/28/2020 | @5/5/2020 | @5/12/2020 | | | |
| | # Positive - CTP | 602,681 | 802,658 | 1,006,023 | 1,195,491 | 1,360,591 | 14.1% | | 1,403,557 |
| | | 80.0% | 95.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 1.8 |
| | C. Positive Case ID | # Hospitaliza | tions | | | | | | |
| # Positive | Week end | 7 | 14 | 21 | 28 | 35 | 42 | 49 | ult |
| 238,103 | 3/31/2020&P | 38,355 | 47,944 | 55,935 | 60,729 | 62,647 | 63,926 | 63,926 | 63,926 |
| 217,695 | 4/7/2020 | 25,048 | 31,311 | 36,529 | 39,660 | 40,912 | 41,747 | | 41,747 |
| 210,892 | 4/14/2020 | 23,962 | 29,953 | 34,945 | 37,940 | 39,138 | | | 39,937 |
| 204,089 | 4/21/2020 | 21,423 | 26,779 | 31,242 | 33,920 | | | | 35,705 |
| 183,680 | 4/28/2020 | 21,470 | 26,838 | 31,311 | | | | | 35,783 |
| 179,025 | 5/5/2020 | 22,961 | 28,701 | | | | | | 38,268 |
| 170,074 | 5/12/2020 | 22,178 | | | a = /= /aaaa | a= /+ a /a aa | | | 36,964 |
| | Maturity | @4/14/2020 | @4/21/2020 | @4/28/2020 | @5/5/2020 | @5/12/2020 | | | |
| | # Hosp - CTP | 117,419 | 153,473 | 185,455 | 224,638 | 260,921 | 19.2% | | 292,331 |
| | | 60.0% | 75.0% | 87.5% | 95.0% | 98.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 5.9 |
| 100100 | D. Hospital Admittanc | 100 | | | | lections comple | | | |
| # Hospital | Week end | 7 | 14 | 21 | 28 | 35 | 42 | 49 | ult |
| 63,926 | 3/31/2020&P | 6,060 | 10,389 | 13,852 | 15,584 | 16,796 | 17,315 | 17,315 | 17,315 |
| 41,747 | 4/7/2020 | 4,961 | 8,504 | 11,339 | 12,757 | 13,749 | 14,174 | | 14,174 |
| | | | | | | 13,408 | | | 13.823 |
| 39,937 | 4/14/2020 | 4,838 | 8,294 | 11,058 | 12,440 | 13,400 | | | |
| 35,705 | 4/21/2020 | 4,767 | 8,172 | 10,897 | 12,259 | 13,400 | | | 13,621 |
| 35,705 35,783 | 4/21/2020 4/28/2020 | 4,767 3,922 | 8,172 6,723 | | | 13,400 | | | 13,621 11,205 |
| 35,705 35,783 38,268 | 4/21/2020 4/28/2020 5/5/2020 | 4,767 3,922 3,888 | 8,172 | 10,897 | | 13,400 | | | 13,621 11,205 11,109 |
| 35,705 35,783 | 4/21/2020 4/28/2020 5/5/2020 5/12/2020 | 4,767 3,922 3,888 3,831 | 8,172 6,723 6,666 | 10,897 8,964 | 12,259 | | | | 13,621 11,205 |
| 35,705 35,783 38,268 | 4/21/2020 4/28/2020 5/5/2020 5/12/2020 Maturity | 4,767 3,922 3,888 3,831 @4/14/2020 | 8,172 6,723 6,666 @4/21/2020 | 10,897 8,964 @4/28/2020 | 12,259 @5/5/2020 | @5/12/2020 | 20.4% | | 13,621 11,205 11,109 10,945 |
| 35,705 35,783 38,268 | 4/21/2020 4/28/2020 5/5/2020 5/12/2020 Maturity # Deaths - CTP | 4,767 3,922 3,888 3,831 @4/14/2020 26,066 | 8,172 6,723 6,666 @4/21/2020 40,554 | 10,897 8,964 @4/28/2020 52,482 | 12,259 @5/5/2020 65,307 | @5/12/2020 76,617 | 29.4% | | 13,621 11,205 11,109 10,945 |
| 35,705 35,783 38,268 | 4/21/2020 4/28/2020 5/5/2020 5/12/2020 Maturity | 4,767 3,922 3,888 3,831 @4/14/2020 26,066 27,195 | 8,172 6,723 6,666 @4/21/2020 40,554 39,984 | 10,897 8,964 @4/28/2020 52,482 52,705 | @5/5/2020 65,307 65,013 | @5/12/2020 76,617 76,617 | | 100.0% | 13,621 11,205 11,109 10,945 92,193 28.0 |
| 35,705 35,783 38,268 | 4/21/2020 4/28/2020 5/5/2020 5/12/2020 Maturity # Deaths - CTP | 4,767 3,922 3,888 3,831 @4/14/2020 26,066 27,195 35.0% | 8,172 6,723 6,666 @4/21/2020 40,554 39,984 60.0% | 10,897 8,964 @4/28/2020 52,482 52,705 80.0% | 05/5/2020 65,307 65,013 90.0% | @5/12/2020 76,617 76,617 97.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 13,621 11,205 11,109 10,945 92,193 28.0 1 |
| 35,705 35,783 38,268 | 4/21/2020 4/28/2020 5/5/2020 5/12/2020 Maturity # Deaths - CTP # Deaths - Est | 4,767 3,922 3,888 3,831 @4/14/2020 26,066 27,195 35.0% 35.0% | 8,172 6,723 6,666 @4/21/2020 40,554 39,984 60.0% 25.0% | 10,897 8,964 @4/28/2020 52,482 52,705 80.0% 20.0% | ### 12,259 ################################### | @5/12/2020 76,617 76,617 97.0% 7.0% | | 100.0% | 13,621 11,205 11,109 10,945 |
| 35,705 35,783 38,268 | 4/21/2020 4/28/2020 5/5/2020 5/12/2020 Maturity # Deaths - CTP | 4,767 3,922 3,888 3,831 @4/14/2020 26,066 27,195 35.0% | 8,172 6,723 6,666 @4/21/2020 40,554 39,984 60.0% | 10,897 8,964 @4/28/2020 52,482 52,705 80.0% | 05/5/2020 65,307 65,013 90.0% | @5/12/2020 76,617 76,617 97.0% | 100.0% | | 13,621 11,205 11,109 10,945 92,193 28.0 t |

Source: compiled by ISO using data from The COVID Tracking Project (https://covidtracking.com/api

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http://www.verisk.com/iso/excess-reinsurance



Concurrent Session 1 - Wheels: Commercial Auto, Another Dip in the Road 📀



- This session provides a year-end 2019 holistic update to the Commercial Auto industry experience and trends, most recently presented at the May CAS On-line Webinar ("as part of the 4-year Wheels series"). In addition to reviewing items such as lengthening LDFs and large loss pressures on ILFs, a comparison between commercial and personal auto trends will be presented.
- A company actuary/underwriting managers perspective will be given on the state of the market, including the expected impact of various societal and jury impacts. Impacts on the portfolio and potential underwriting responses, as well as discussion of the significant issues and pausing impacts from Covid-19, will be given.
- To also help frame potential scenarios, this session will Include a historical look to prior shock events including the Great Recession on premium level dips, troughs and recovery shapes, and a framework for measuring similar impacts under various Covid-19 emerging scenarios. A conceptual actuarial triangle approach to estimating various Covid components will also be given.



John W. Buchanan, FCAS, MAAA

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John Buchanan, FCAS, MAAA, is a principal in charge of ISO's Excess and Reinsurance Division. He has over 30 years of experience as a front-line pricing actuary and consultant in the US, London, and other international reinsurance marketplaces.

In John's career, he has conceptualized, developed and implemented extensive benchmarking and modeling services for various reinsurers, excess carriers, and industry groups. He has pioneered extensive work to extend information gathered in mature benchmarking markets, and applying the information to International markets making use of local and customized knowledge. He was a frontline sign-off actuary for many domestic and international lines of business. While a consultant, he was the main contact for the Reinsurance Association of America and the Reinsurance Research Council of Canada as well as working extensively with the London and European reinsurance market through the Casualty Actuaries in Reinsurance in London. He also formed and chaired the multi-discipline joint IFoA-CAS International Pricing Research Working Party. The resulting paper, "Analyzing the Disconnect Between the Reinsurance Submission and Global Underwriter's Needs - Property Per Risk", won the prestigious 2016 IFoA UK Brian Hey and the 2019 CAS US Hachemeister awards.

John's professional accomplishments also include being heavily involved with many international meteorological groups including NOAA, UK-Met, GLOBE, ACRE, and was chairperson of the CAS Climate Change Student Outreach subcommittee. He is on the CARe committee responsible for many of the annual CARe conference educational tracks, and previously at the CAS Ratemaking Seminar. He has been a moderator and panelist at dozens of industry seminars on the topic of domestic and international reinsurance pricing, the underwriting cycle, international benchmarking, etc.

Prior to joining Verisk, John was a Senior Vice President at Platinum Underwriters (previously St. Paul Beinsurance), a Principal at Tillinghast (now Towers Watson), and a Senior Consultant at KPMG, Peat Marwick. He has also competed and won many medals and trophies as an amateur in the Global Salsa Championships, and is determined to write the book "The Mathematician's Guide to Salsa Dancing". He has also written and directed a few sponsored films entitled "Franklin Climate Change" and "Cuba People to People" with the latter selected to run at various film festivals and described in September 2018 CAS actuarial review article.

John has also been awarded with the 2020 Matthew Rodermund Memorial Service Award, recognizing CAS members who have made significant volunteer contributions to the actuarial profession over the course of their career.

Sean Devlin, FCAS, MAAA

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Sean Devlin, FCAS, MAAA is a Team leader in the Casualty Actuarial Analytics department for Swiss Re North America.

- Sean currently leads a team of 6 Fellows costing reinsurance treaty business
- 30 years of experience in the insurance industry with 22 years in reinsurance with Swiss Re. Prior to that Sean worked for Munich Re, USF&G and GEICO
- Sean's focus the last several years has been on automobile business, both commercial and personal (including nonstandard auto)



