Why 2008 is Shaping Up To Be a Make or Break Year for the P/C Insurance Industry

> Casualty Actuaries of Greater New York New York, NY

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#### **Presentation Outline**

- 1. Declining Profitability—Past the Cyclical Peak
  - Ratings & Financial Strength
- 2. Deteriorating Underwriting Trends: Still Strong, for How Long?
  - Key Personal & Commercial Lines Review
- 3. Vanishing Premium Growth: Approaching a Standstill
- 4. Weak Pricing: Competitive Pressures Mounting
- 5. Rising Expenses: Creeping Upward
- 6. Overcapacity: Rapid Capital/Surplus Growth →ROE Pressure
- 7. Investment Volatility: More Pain, Less Gain
- 8. Catastrophic Loss: The Worst Has Yet to Come
- 9. Shifting Legal Liability & Tort Environment: Will the Pendulum Swing Against Insurers?
- **10. Regulatory & Legislative Zealotry:** *Scrutiny is Mounting*




# #1 DECLINING PROFITABILITY

Profits in 2006/7 Reached Their Cyclical Peak; ROEs Already Falling


#### P/C Net Income After Taxes 1991-2007F (\$ Millions)\*

•2001 ROE = -1.2%**Insurer profits peaked in** •2002 ROE = 2.2%2006/7. "Normal" CAT year, \$65,192 \$63,695 average investment gain •2003 ROE = 8.9% \$70,000 imply flattening •2004 ROE = 9.4%\$60,000 •2005 ROE= 9.4% \$44,155 •2006  $ROAS^1 = 14.0\%$ \$36,819 \$50,000 338,501 •2007F ROAS = 13.1%\*\* \$30,773 \$30,029 \$40,000 \$24,404 \$21,865 \$20,598 \$20,559 \$19,310 \$30,000 \$14,178 \$10,870 \$20,000 \$5,840 \$3,046 \$10,000 \$0 -\$10,000 -\$6,970 96 9 98 5 5 \*ROE figures are GAAP; <sup>1</sup>Return on avg. surplus. 2007F figure is annualized actual first half net income of \$32,596B \*\*Actual first half 2007 result. Sources: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Inst.




Source: Insurance Information Institute; Fortune

#### RETURN ON EQUITY (Fortune): Stock & Mutual vs. All Companies\*




\*Fortune 1,000 group.

Source: Fortune Magazine, Insurance Information Institute.




\*2007 is actual first half ROAS of 13.1%. 2008 P/C insurer ROE is I.I.I. estimate. Source: Insurance Information Institute; *Fortune* 

### ROE vs. Equity Cost of Capital: US P/C Insurance:1991-2007E




#### Insurance & Reinsurance Stocks: Finally Gaining in 2007


#### **Total YTD Returns Through November 30, 2007**



#### Top Industries by ROE: P/C Insurers Still Underperformed in 2006\*




\*Excludes #1 ranked Airline category at 65.1% due to special one-time bankruptcy-related factors. Source: Fortune, April 30, 2007 edition; Insurance Information Institute




Source: Insurance Information Institute from consolidated P/C Annual Statement data.

# FINANCIAL STRENGTH & RATINGS

Industry Has Weathered the Storms Well, But Cycle May Takes Its Toll



Source: A.M. Best: P/C Impairments Hit Near-Term Lows Despite Surging Hurricane Activity, Special Report, Nov. 2005;




Source: A.M. Best; Insurance Information Institute


### #2 DETERIORATING UNDERWRITING

Extremely Strong 2006/07; Relying on Momentum & Discipline for 2008


#### P/C Insurance Combined Ratio, 1970-2008F\*




#### P/C Insurance Combined Ratio, 2001-2008F




#### Ten Lowest P/C Insurance Combined Ratios Since 1920 (& 2007:H1)




Sources: Insurance Information Institute research from A.M. Best data. \*2007 first half actual.



annualized to \$28.8B.




#### Cumulative Prior Year Reserve Development by Line (As of 12/31/06)




Sources: Lehman Brothers; A.M. Best's Aggregates & Averages Schedule P, Part 2.

## PERSONAL LINES





Source: A.M. Best; Insurance Information Institute



#### Private Passenger Auto (PPA) Combined Ratio **Auto insurers have** 109.5 **PPA** is the profit 110 shown significant 107.9 juggernaut of the p/c **improvement** in **PPA underwriting** insurance industry today performance since 104.2 105 103.5 mid-2002, but results are 101.7101.3101.3101.0 101.1 deteriorating. 99.5 100 98.4 96.5 94.3 95.1 95.5 **Average Combined** 95 **Ratio for 1993 to 2006:** 101.0 90

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Sources: A.M. Best; III

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
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
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
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#### RNW: Private Passenger Auto, United States, 1992-2006E






Source: Insurance Information Institute calculations based ISO Fast Track and US BLS data.




### PD Liability: Frequency Trend No Longer Offsets Severity




\*Average of 4 quarters ending with 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter 2007. Source: ISO Fast Track data.

### PIP: Frequency Trend Now Offsets Rising Claim Severity




### Collision: Frequency and Severity Claim Trend Adverse



\*Average of 4 quarters ending with 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter 2007. Source: ISO Fast Track data.


#### Comprehensive: Favorable Frequency and Severity Trends




Source: ISO Fast Track data.

### Homeowners Insurance








Source: NAIC; 2006 figure is Insurance Information Institute estimate.

# COMMERCIAL LINES

### Commercial Auto Commercial Multi-Peril Workers Comp




#### The Big Question: Is the Industry More Disciplined Today?

- Signs suggest that the answer is yes
- Current period of sustained underwriting profitability is the first since the 1950s
- While prices are falling, underlying lost cost trends (frequency and severity trends) are generally favorable to benign
   > Suggest impact of falling prices will be less pronounced than late 1990s
- Reserve situation appears much improved an under control
- Management Information Systems: Much More Sophisticated
  - Insurers can monitor and make adjustments much more quickly
  - > Adjustments made quickly by line, geographic area, producer, etc.
- Investment Income
  - Relative to late 1990s, interest rates and stock markets returns are lower
  - Has effect of imposing (some) discipline
- Ratings Agencies
  - More stringent capital requirements
  - > Quicker to downgrade


### COMMERCIAL MULTI-PERIL & COMMERCIAL AUTO



### Commercial Auto Liability & PD Combined Ratios



### *Commercial Multi-Peril Combined* (*Liability vs. Non-Liability Portion*)




### WORKERS COMPENSATION OPERATING ENVIRONMENT



#### Workers Comp Combined Ratios, 1994-2006P

Workers Comp Calendar Year vs. Ultimate Accident Year -



#### Calendar Year Accident Year


Accident Year data is evaluated as of 12/31/2006 and developed to ultimate

Source: Calendar Years 1994-2005, A.M. Best Aggregates & Averages; Calendar Year 2006p and Accident Years 1994-2006pbased on NCCI Annual Statement Analysis.

Includes dividends to policyholders

p Preliminary AY figure.

### Workers Comp Lost-Time Claim Frequency (% Change)




2003p: Preliminary based on data valued as of 12/31/2006 1991-2005: Based on data through 12/31/2005, developed to ultimate Based on the states where NCCI provides ratemaking services Excludes the effects of deductible policies Source: NCCI

### Workers Comp Indemnity Claims Costs Have Accelerated, 1993-2006p


Indemnity Claim Cost (000s)




2005p: Preliminary based on data valued as of 12/31/2006 1991-2005: Based on data through 12/31/2005, developed to ultimate Based on the states where NCCI provides ratemaking services Excludes the effects of deductible policies Source: NCCI




Sources: Med CPI from US Bureau of Labor Statistics, WC med severity from NCCI based on NCCI states.



Source: NCCI (based on states where NCCI provides ratemaking services).



#### Strength of Recent Hard Markets by NWP Growth\*



Note: Shaded areas denote hard market periods. Source: A.M. Best, Insurance Information Institute

\*2007-10 figures are III forecasts/estimates.


#### Growth in Net Written Premium, 2000-2008F

**P/C insurers will experience** 15.3% their slowest growth rates since the late 1990s...but underwriting results are 10.0% expected to remain healthy 8.4% 5.0% 3.9% 2.7% 0.5% 0.1% 0.0% 2002 2000 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007F\* 2008F


\*2007 figure base on 2007 actual first half result of 0.1%. Source: A.M. Best; Forecasts from the Insurance Information Institute.

## #4 WEAK PRICING

Under Intense Pressure in 2007/08, Especially Commercial Lines




Source: NAIC, Insurance Information Institute




\*\*Excludes cost of flood and earthquake coverage. Source: NAIC, Insurance Information Institute

#### Homeowners Insurance Expenditures as a % of Median Existing Home Prices, 1995-2008F



forecasts for years 2005-2008.




Source: Council of Insurance Agents & Brokers; Insurance Information Institute

### #5 RISING EXPENSES

### Expense Ratios Will Rise as Premium Growth Slows






\*Ratio of expenses incurred to net premiums written. Source: A.M. Best; Insurance Information Institute

### #6 OVERCAPACITY


Accumulation of Capital/ Surplus Depresses ROEs

### U.S. Policyholder Surplus: 1975-2007\*




Source: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Institute.

\*As of June 30, 2007



Source: 1985–2006, A.M. Best Aggregates & Averages;; 2007 ISO

### Annual Catastrophe Bond Transactions Volume, 1997-2006



Source: MMC Securities and Guy Carpenter; Insurance Information Institute.


### P/C Insurer Share Repurchases, 1987- Through Q3 2007 (\$ Millions)

		Reasons Behind Capital Build- Up & Repurchase Surge									First 9-months 2007 share buybacks are already 133% of the 2006 record										
\$20,000	Γ	<ul> <li>Strong underwriting results</li> <li>Moderate catastrophe losses</li> </ul>															<b>^</b> \$1	7,41	2.7		
\$18,000 \$16,000		•Reasonable investment										2007 repurchases to								.,	
\$14,000	_	performance •Lack of strategic alternatives										date equate to 4.4% of									
\$12,000		(M&A, large-scale expansion)										industry surplus, the highest in 20 years									
\$10,000	-	Returning capital owners (shareholders) is one of the few options available									10		0			•		2.3	0	\$7,094.1	3
\$8,000 \$6,000			Iew	op		sav		bie		9	\$4,497.	\$4,586.5	\$5,266.	\$4,297.3	4.2			\$5,24	\$4,370.0	\$	
\$4,000	-0	6	0	4.	-	8		8	2	.385.		₹		4	\$2,764.2	\$1,539.9	Г.		2		
\$2,000	\$564.0	\$646.9	\$311.0	\$952	\$418.	\$566.	\$310.	\$658.8	\$769.2	\$2						\$1,	\$763.7				
\$0	22			90						9	-	98	6	0		02	03	4	S.	90	03
Sources: Cre						•									0	0	0	0	0	0	070

### MERGER & ACQUISITION


### **Few Catalysts for Major P/C Consolidation in '08**






Source: Conning Research & Consulting.

### Distribution Sector: Insurance-Related M&A Activity, 1988-2006






Source: Conning Research & Consulting

### #7 FLAT & VOLATILE INVESTMENTS




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
757677787980818283848586878889909192939495969798990001020304050607\* Source: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Institute; \*Includes special dividend of \$3.2B. Increase is 15.7% excluding dividend. \*\*Based on annualized H1 result of \$26.128B.

#### Total Returns for Large Company Stocks: 1970-2007\*


S&P 500 was up 13.62% in 2006, Up 4.43% YTD 2007\*



### US P/C Net Realized Capital Gains, 1990-2007:H1 (\$ Millions)



#### Property/Casualty Insurance Industry Investment Gain<sup>1</sup>




<sup>1</sup>Investment gains consist primarily of interest, stock dividends and realized capital gains and losses. 2006 figure consists of \$52.3B net investment income and \$3.4B realized investment gain. \*2005 figure includes special one-time dividend of \$3.2B. \*\*Annualized H1 result of \$30.301B. Sources: ISO; Insurance Information Institute.


### #8 CATASTROPHIC LOSS

# What Will 2008 Bring?

### Most of US Population & Property Has Major CAT Exposure




## U.S. Insured Catastrophe Losses\*



\*Excludes \$4B-\$6b offshore energy losses from Hurricanes Katrina & Rita. \*\*Estimate. <u>Note</u>: 2001 figure includes \$20.3B for 9/11 losses reported through 12/31/01. Includes only business and personal property claims, business interruption and auto claims. Non-prop/BI losses = \$12.2B. Source: Property Claims Service/ISO; Insurance Information Institute


#### Inflation-Adjusted U.S. Insured Catastrophe Losses By Cause of Loss, 1987-2006<sup>1</sup>



 <sup>1</sup> Catastrophes are all events causing direct insured losses to property of \$25 million or more in 2006 dollars. Catastrophe threshold changed from \$5 million to \$25 million beginning in 1997. Adjusted for inflation by the III.
 <sup>2</sup> Excludes snow. <sup>3</sup> Includes hurricanes and tropical storms. <sup>4</sup> Includes other geologic events such as volcanic eruptions and other earth movement. <sup>5</sup> Does not include flood damage covered by the federally administered National Flood Insurance Program. <sup>6</sup> Includes wildland fires.
 Source: Insurance Services Office (ISO)..

### Top Ten Catastrophic Wildland Fires In California, 1970-2007\*


#### **Insured Losses (Millions 2006 \$)**




Source: ISO's Property Claim Services Unit; Insurance Information Institute.

### Top Catastrophic Wildland Fires In The United States, 1970-2007\*

**Insured Losses (Millions 2006 \$)** 




\*Estimated insured losses. Adjusted to 2006 dollars by the Insurance Information Institute. 2007 fire losses are stated in 2007 dollars. Source: ISO's Property Claim Services Unit; Insurance Information Institute.



\*All figures (except 2006 loss) have been adjusted to 2005 dollars. Source: PCS division of ISO.


### 2007 Hurricane Season: No Big Hits...So Far



Source: www.wunderground.com, accessed 11/3/07; Insurance Information Institute


## REINSURANCE MARKETS

Reinsurance Prices are Stabilizing; Falling in Some Areas



\*Excludes losses paid by the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, a FL-only windstorm reinsurer, which was established in 1994 *after* Hurricane Andrew. FHCF payments to insurers are estimated at \$3.85 billion for 2004 and \$4.5 billion for 2005.

Sources: Wharton Risk Center, Disaster Insurance Project; Insurance Information Institute.




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Is the Pendulum Swinging Against Insurers?

## Bad Year for Tort Kingpins\*





#### "King of Class Actions" Bill Lerach

•Former partner in class action firm Milberg Weiss

•Admitted felon. Guilty of paying 3 plaintiffs \$11.4 million in 150+ cases over 25 years & lying about it repeatedly to courts

•Will serves 1-2 years in prison and forfeit \$7.75 million; \$250,000 fine


#### "King of Torts" Dickie Scruggs

•Won billions in tobacco, asbestos and Katrina litigation


•Indicted for attempting to offer a judge \$50,000 bribe to resolve attorney fee allocation from Katrina litigation in his firm's favor. His son and others indicted too.

Could get 75 years in prison, \$1.5 million fine

## Personal, Commercial & Self (Un) Insured Tort Costs\*



Source: Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2006 Update on US Tort Cost Trends.



Source: Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2006 Update on US Tort Cost Trends; 2006 is III estimate.

## **Business Leaders Ranking of** Liability Systems for 2007

#### **Best States**

LL

- Delaware 1
- 2. Minnesota
- 3. Nebraska
- 4. Iowa
- 5. Maine
- New Hampshire 6.
- Tennessee 7.
- Indiana 8.
- 9 Utah
- 10. Wisconsin

Midwest/West has mix of good and bad states

UT, WI

WY, ID




Source: US Chamber of Commerce 2007 State Liability Systems Ranking Study; Insurance Info. Institute.

## The Nation's Judicial Hellholes (2006)

### Watch List

Miller County, AR Los Angeles County, CA San Francisco, CA Philadelphia, PA **Orleans Parish, LA** Delaware Dishonorable Mentions Providence, RI MA Supreme Court LA Supreme Court New Jersey **NE Supreme Court** California



## iii

### Catastrophe Litigation

- Insurers have won virtually every major case in post-Katrina litigation environment
  - Most cases centered on validity of flood exclusion and various wind vs. water theories
- This came at a high PR cost as post-Katrina litigation was dragged out over a 2-year period accounting for the vast majority of negative press in the first 16 months after the storm
   FL significantly added to negative press in 2007
- While the industry was successful at explaining the rational for pursuing most cases, it struggled with the classic David vs. Goliath story
- Championed by personally affected politicians
- Feeds "Insurance Hoax" genre of stories
  - View that insurers systematically deny, delay and lowball
  - **Bad Faith litigation is wave of future (e.g., LA AG suit)**

### Preventing/Limiting Erosion of Recent Tort Reform

- Tort Pendulum Likely to Swing Against Insurers as Political Environment Changes (WA referendum, FL No-Fault?)
- Insurers Must Remain Active Members of Tort Reform Coalitions at State and Federal Level
  - May have more success at the state level
- Pursuing Good Cases Can Set Precedent & Bring About Quantum Shifts in Judicial Philosophy
  - Campbell v. State Farm (limited punitives)
  - Safeco v. Burr, Geico v. Edo (FCRA reporting violations)
  - Asbestos: Class actions limited; no pre-pack bankruptcies
  - Products Liability: Merck's successful Vioxx defense
- Educate Policyholders About Link Between Tort Environment and Cost/Availability of Insurance
  - Businesses understand; Need facts to support local efforts
  - Personal lines customers understand relationship, agents do
- Tighten Contract Language
  - From 9/11 to Katrina, alleged "ambiguities" cost big bucks

## #10 REGULATORY/ LEGISLATIVE ZEALOTRY

**iii** Scrutiny is Mounting

## Legal, Legislative & Regulatory Threats are Multiplying (cont'd)

- **<u>Attacks on Underwriting</u>:** Perennial issue, with challenges to even longestablished underwriting criteria popping up; Will be a bigger problem with evolution of Predictive Modeling
  - Credit-Based Insurance Scores: Remain the largest issue & became the subject of a US House O&I hearing Oct. 2
  - Education/Occupation Attacked (e.g., FL)

•

- CAT Models: Black box allegation, short vs. long-term model
- Any type of individual risk rating factor is subject to allegations of discrimination
- <u>Allegations of Collusion via Ratings Agencies, Trades & Modelers</u>: Novel theory espoused by Gov. Crist and OIR in FL that insurers collude indirectly via ratings agencies, trade associations and modeling firms
  - Some insurers subpoenaed for documents
  - Some discussion at recent NAIC meeting
- <u>Proliferation of Insurance Regulators</u>: Insurance Commissioner's influence and power is waning in many states. There are 632 insurance regulators in the US (50 Commissioners, 50 AGs, 50 Governors, 50 Senators and 432 US)
  - Attorneys General: Spitzer (and copycats) did serious damage to commissioner authority; Followed by AG Hood in MS; Foti in LA.
  - > Congress is exerting itself over a wide range of issues
  - Governors like Crist not shy on insurance matters Source: Insurance Information Institute.

## REGULATORY UPDATE

## Busy Year for Insurers in Washington



## Federal Legislative Update

#### **Federal Terrorism Reinsurance (TRIA)**

• TRIA expires 12/31/07. The current federal program offers \$100 billion of coverage subject to a \$27.5B industry aggregate retention.

• Under S. 2761: "Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007"

- 7-Yr. Extension, expiring 12/31/14
- Maintains 20% Direct Earned Premium Deductible for duration of Extension (about \$35B)
- > NBCR risks remain *excluded* (in contrast to House bill)
- Eliminates distinction between foreign and domestic acts of terrorism
- > Deletes requirement that terrorist act be on behalf of foreign person or foreign interest
- > Changes in definition of terrorist act require substantial rate and form filings in states
- Federal government's cap remains at \$100 billion through 2014
- Requires Comptroller General to issue report within 1 year on feasibility of NBCR insurance market; CG must also issue report within 180 days on obstacles in development of private sector market for terror insurance
- Administration has said it will not oppose Senate bill (issued veto threat for House)

**Sources: Insurance Information Institute** 

## Federal Legislative Update

#### **Natural Disaster Coverage**

- Some insurers are pushing for federal catastrophic risk fund coverage in the wake of billions of dollars of losses suffered by insurers from the 2004-2005 hurricane seasons.
- Legislative relief addressing property/casualty insurers' exposure to natural catastrophes, such as the creation of state and federal catastrophe funds, has been advocated by insurers include Allstate and State Farm recently. However, there is active opposition many other insurers and all reinsurers.
- There are supporters in Congress, mostly from CAT-prone states. Skeptics in Congress believe such a plan would be a burden on taxpayers like the NFIP and that the private sector can do a better job. Unlike TRIA, the industry is not unified on this issue.
- Allowing insurers to establish tax free reserves for future catastrophe losses has also been proposed, but Congress has not yet indicated much support.

Sources: Lehman Brothers, Insurance Information Institute

#### How the Homeowners Defense Act of 2007 Would Operate State facilities may cede risk into Consortium Consortium may Florida Hurricane cede assumed Catastrophe Fund risk to private Consortium markets Capital Markets Information collection Investors Expert consulting Florida Citizens Transaction structuring or Market analysis Reinsurers catastrophe modeling Texas Windstorm U/W Association Consortium may provide assistance to State facilities in making insurance linked security or other risk transfer placements

Source: Zurich Technical Center, Federal Legislative Series Report, November 13, 2007.

# Homeowners Defense Act of 2007: How it Works & Rationale

### The Act has Three Main Components:

- 1. Establishment of Consortium to encourage state facilities to cede risk into the private markets, particularly the catastrophe bond markets
- 2. Creation of a Federal loan program to provide preevent liquidity and post-event long term financing for state residual markets and catastrophe funds
- 3. Creation of a Federal catastrophe fund to back-stop state catastrophe funds

Source: Zurich Technical Center, Federal Legislative Series Report, November 13, 2007.

### Homeowners Defense Act of 2007: How it Works & Rationale

- With the back-drop of frequently poor financial conditions within State property residual markets in certain states, the objectives of the Bill appear to be:
- 1. Transfer of catastrophic risk from under-capitalized state facilities into the global reinsurance network and capital markets
- 2. Ensuring the ability of these State facilities to make good on their commitments in the weeks after a storm and to spread over-time the potentially massive state taxpayer burden caused by under-capitalization and unsound pricing
- 3. Transfer high layer cat risk to the Federal taxpayer

Source: Zurich Technical Center, Federal Legislative Series Report, November 13, 2007.

### Homeowners Defense Act of 2007: How it Works & Rationale

### The Main Questions Appear to be Whether:

- 1. The Bill would lead to the structural changes necessary to bring these facilities into financial health over time or simply enable further fiscal deterioration
- 2. The State facilities could be otherwise motivated to purchase reinsurance and explore capital market solutions without the need for Federal involvement
- 3. Adequate private capital can be mustered to meet the borrowing needs of the State catastrophe funds and residual markets

Source: Zurich Technical Center, Federal Legislative Series Report, August 31, 2007.

## Federal Legislative Update

#### **Optional Federal Charter (OFC)**

- Large P&C and life insurers are the major supporters of OFC. Supporters argue that the current patchwork of 50 state regulators reduces competition, redundant, slows new product introductions and adds cost to the system.
- In general, global P/C insurers, reinsurers and large brokers mostly support the concept, while regulators (state insurance commissioners), small single-state and regional insurers, and independent agency groups largely oppose the idea. An optional federal charter is more favorable for global P&C insurers, because an insurer that operates in multiple states could opt to be regulated under federal rules rather than multiple state regulations. As a result, this could increase innovation in the industry.
- Currently appears to be more momentum for OFC for life than for P&C insurers based on the homogeneous nature of many life products. The debate should intensify and although passage may not occur in the current session of Congress, it may lay the groundwork for passage in the 2009-2010 session.

Sources: Lehman Brothers, Insurance Information Institute

### Summary Results were *unsustainably* good 2006; Overall profitability reached its highest level (est. 14%) since 1988 Strong first half in 2007 but ROEs slipping Underwriting results were aided by lack of CATs & favorable underlying loss trends, including tort system improvements **Property cat reinsurance markets past peak & more competitive** Premium growth rates are slowing to their levels since the late 1990s; Commercial leads decreases. **Rising investment returns insufficient to support deep soft** market in terms of price, terms & conditions Clear need to remain underwriting focused How/where to deploy/redeploy capital?? **Major Challenges:**

- Slow Growth Environment Ahead
- > Maintaining price/underwriting discipline
- > Managing variability/volatility of results
- > Managing regulatory/legislative activism



Insurance Information Institute On-Line



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