



## Price Optimization

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# Price Optimization-Practical Challenges

Presented by:

Lee M. Bowron, ACAS, MAAA

lee@earnix.com

www.earnix.com



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
## What is an insurance CEO's number one concern?

From Dow Jones:

*Insurance executives say insurance pricing weakness is the biggest risk their industry faces in the next few years.*

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## What does the customer think?





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## Many concepts are overlapping...

- Lifetime value
- Demand modeling
- Competitive analysis
- Retention modeling
- Scenario modeling
- Price Optimization
- Others?

**Unlike other predictive modeling projects, you must “push” more to the end user (the underwriter, the product manager, the pricing actuary)**



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## The Renewal Dilemma

- The more tenure, the better the loss ratio
- But switching can be hard, tenure = value
- Most companies will ignore renewals or not give the full actuarial discount – is that the optimal treatment?



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## Demand Modeling

- Given a quote, will we convert?
- Start getting the data now (the ether of the renewal offer)
- Different for new business and renewals
- A key variable is the amount of rate change as well as the tenure of the policy

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## GLMs can be used to model demand

Logistic regression analyzes binomially distributed data of the form

$$Y_i \sim B(p_i, n_i), \text{ for } i = 1, \dots, m,$$

where the numbers of Bernoulli trials  $n_i$  are known and the probabilities of success  $p_i$  are unknown.

An example of this distribution is the fraction of flowers ( $p_i$ ) that germinate after  $n_i$  are planted.


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## Demand models (Continued)

The model is then that for each trial (value of  $i$ ) there is a set of explanatory/independent variables that might inform the final probability. These explanatory variables can be thought of as being in a  $k$  vector  $X_i$  and the model then takes the form

$$p_i = E \left( \frac{Y_i}{n_i} \mid X_i \right) .$$





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## Demand Models (Continued)


The logits of the unknown binomial probabilities (*i.e.*, the logarithms of the odds) are modeled as a linear function of the  $X_i$ .

$$\text{logit}(p_i) = \ln \left( \frac{p_i}{1 - p_i} \right) = \beta_1 x_{1,i} + \dots + \beta_k x_{k,i}.$$

Note: there are other ways to analyze demand, but make sure you are doing it in a statistically significant manner.


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### Effect of Previous Claim on Renewal Demand




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### Effect of Premium Increase on Renewal Demand



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### Effect of Tenure on Renewal Demand





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Next step is optimization

*The “Objective Function”*

Given an objective of  $X$  subject to the condition  $Y$  what is the price  $I$  should charge?



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## Xs and Ys

### Optimization is not blind profit maximization!

#### Possible Objectives (X)

- More profit
- More volume
- More retention

#### Possible Constraints (Y)

- Rate Change
- Actuarial Indications
- Volume
- Retention
- Profit



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## Lifetime Value

- Lifetime value is the present value of a piece of business today to the company
- Easy to explain, but hard to implement

**Example: a 25 year old single male buys a liability only policy**

- Will he eventually get full coverage?
- Will he eventually get married (and stay with the company)?
- Will he buy a homeowner's policy from us?
- Will he buy life insurance?



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## Optimization

- Once you have defined the objective function, you must find the optimal points
- Use calculus to find the minimum/maximums
- Because of the complexity of the objective function and the constraints, this is a difficult problem to solve.





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## Monitoring

- One of the benefits of an optimization type analysis are detailed predictions of the amount and type of renewals and new business.
- Deviations can be sign of a “model breakdown” – competitors changing rates, changes in underlying demand.
- Can be a tool for not only what to charge but when to change rates.




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## Arguments against optimization

1. We are getting away from expected costs.

- European companies are monitoring this issue, they haven't seen major problems.

- Hard market would likely see focus return to costs.



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## Arguments against optimization

2. “I want to maximize PIF and take no policies below the cost of capital, therefore I don’t want to under price (capital destruction) and I don’t want to overprice (I won’t sell as many policies).”



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## Arguments against optimization

Answer: Focus on Marginal ROE

- Determine the amount of expenses fixed over the policy term.
- Throw these OUT!
- If fixed expenses are 10% of last year's premium, and you need to price to a 4% underwriting profit, you can now price a policy to -6% underwriting profit and still make your return on capital.



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## Regulatory Issues

Regulation – Open Issues

- **Optimization began in Europe and Israel where there is little rate regulation.**
- **Easier to implement in commercial lines.**
- **Might be possible to optimize a regulated line if you have related products (example: worker's comp)**
- **Personal lines implementation will vary by state.**



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# Regulatory Issues

Regulation – Open Issues

**Most companies don't currently file actuarially indicated rates for every cell**

- **Ignored Classification Issues (Renewals versus New Business)**
- **Credibility**
- **Competitive Issues**
- **Stability**



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## What is optimization?

**Optimization is a tool to assist rating judgment to balance these factors as well as actuarial considerations, it's just formalizing what we currently do.**



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## Price optimization in the travel industry

Differences:

- Demand can be more elastic in travel than insurance due to ease of substitution. This will vary by consumer and (in the case of airlines) the specific route.
- High variable costs in the insurance industry means that one less policy causes significantly less costs.
- Supply is highly constrained in the short term for travel, especially hotels. (Check New York hotel rates)





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## Final Thoughts

- People like optimized prices – Optimization makes some prices more affordable. This could lower uninsured rates since marginal customers are the most elastic.
- Entrenched in Europe
- Still early in the process for the US – early adapters may make a lot of money (See “Credit Scoring” circa 1990)
- Regulatory impact unclear