



### **2007 CAS SPRING MEETING**

The State of the Casualty Reinsurance Market

June 19, 2007

Linda C. Johnson Executive Vice President Benfield

Linda.Johnson@us.benfieldgroup.com 952.886.8093



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#### **US P&C Reinsurance Combined Ratios**



**Casualty Loss & LAE Ratios** 

SOURCE: Highline Data and Federal Reserve Economic Database

Interest Rates and the Underwriting Cycle Impact Future Pricing— Today's Relatively Lower Interest Rates Should Mitigate Rate Decreases

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SOURCE: Highline Data and Federal Reserve Economic Database

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When a Consistent Scale is Used, Year 2000 Products Liability Ceded Results Become Highlighted



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SOURCE: Highline Data and Federal Reserve Economic Database

Underlying Claims Frequency and Severity Assumptions Impact Reinsurers' Allocation of Capital to Specific Lines of Business...

![](_page_7_Figure_2.jpeg)

SOURCE: Sample Insurance Company Data

![](_page_8_Figure_1.jpeg)

SOURCE: Sample Insurance Company Data

...the Number of Selected Years Materially Impacts One's View of Claims Severity Trend

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![](_page_9_Figure_1.jpeg)

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SOURCE: Benfield's 2007 Global Reinsurance Market Review – Pick 'n Mix

![](_page_10_Figure_1.jpeg)

US R/I Industry Policyholders' Surplus

SOURCE: Reinsurance Association of America

SOURCE: Lloyd's of London

Lloyd's Capacity

The Amount of Capital, as well as the "Per Capita" Capital, Drives More (or More Significant) Programs to Fewer Key Players

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In Summary, Factors Impacting the Casualty Reinsurance Market Include:

- Cycle Management
- Claims Trends in Most Lines Have Improved Materially in Recent Years
- Strong Reinsurer Returns in 2006
- Interest Rates are Relatively Low But Improving
- Growing Competition For Remaining Programs
  - Cedents Increasing Retentions
  - Role of Capital Markets
- Reinsurers Remain Optimistic

![](_page_11_Picture_10.jpeg)

![](_page_12_Picture_1.jpeg)

#### **Derivation of a Reinsurance Rate**

\$500K xs \$500K Flat Rate

![](_page_13_Figure_3.jpeg)

| Direct & Assumed Loss & LAE Ratio |                             |                   |          |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |                   |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-------------------|
| Accident/Report                   |                             | Schedule P Year A |          |        |        |        |        |         |         |         | Adverse/Favorable |
| Year                              | 1997                        | 1998              | 1999     | 2000   | 2001   | 2002   | 2003   | 2004    | 2005    | 2006    | Development       |
| 1988                              | 82.03%                      |                   |          |        |        |        |        |         |         |         | 0.00%             |
| 1989                              | 86.78%                      | 86.71%            |          |        |        |        |        |         |         |         | -0.08%            |
| 1990                              | 86.34%                      | 86.10%            | 85.82%   |        |        |        |        |         |         |         | -0.60%            |
| 1991                              | 81.40%                      | 81.16%            | 80.64%   | 80.27% |        |        |        |         |         |         | -1.38%            |
| 1992                              | 78.15%                      | 77.86%            | 77.02%   | 76.87% | 76.69% |        |        |         |         |         | -1.87%            |
| 1993                              | 77.20%                      | 76.77%            | 75.68%   | 75.32% | 75.13% | 75.16% |        |         |         |         | -2.64%            |
| 1994                              | 79.30%                      | 78.83%            | 77.74%   | 77.47% | 77.29% | 77.15% | 77.44% |         |         |         | -2.35%            |
| 1995                              | 79.73%                      | 79.20%            | 78.18%   | 77.90% | 77.67% | 77.54% | 77.87% | 77.91%  |         |         | -2.29%            |
| 1996                              | 80.35%                      | 80.92%            | 80.11%   | 79.98% | 79.54% | 79.59% | 79.72% | 79.85%  | 80.37%  |         | 0.02%             |
| 1997                              | 81.19%                      | 82.04%            | 82.50%   | 83.07% | 83.51% | 83.85% | 84.05% | 84.15%  | 84.79%  | 84.82%  | 4.48%             |
| 1998                              |                             | 83.99%            | 84.97%   | 86.83% | 88.19% | 89.81% | 90.64% | 91.51%  | 92.58%  | 92.58%  | 10.24%            |
| 1999                              |                             |                   | 85.51%   | 88.80% | 92.96% | 95.56% | 97.72% | 97.94%  | 99.40%  | 99.88%  | <b>16.81%</b>     |
| 2000                              |                             |                   | _        | 87.01% | 90.51% | 94.74% | 98.55% | 100.22% | 102.19% | 102.89% | 18.25%            |
| 2001                              |                             |                   |          |        | 87.78% | 89.41% | 92.30% | 94.10%  | 96.86%  | 97.55%  | 11.13%            |
| 2002                              |                             |                   |          |        |        | 79.48% | 79.76% | 80.35%  | 81.97%  | 82.51%  | 3.81%             |
| 2003                              | Adverse Development Creates |                   |          |        |        |        | 74.64% | 71.66%  | 71.09%  | 70.74%  | -5.22%            |
| 2004                              | Daram                       | otor Ll           | ncortai  | inty   |        |        |        | 72.78%  | 68.68%  | 66.75%  | -8.28%            |
| 2005                              | Falalli                     | eler U            | licertai | пцу    |        |        |        |         | 72.74%  | 69.39%  | -4.61%            |
| 2006                              |                             |                   |          |        |        |        |        |         |         | 72.11%  | 0.00%             |
|                                   |                             |                   |          |        |        |        |        |         |         |         |                   |
| Average                           | 81.25%                      | 81.36%            | 80.82%   | 81.35% | 82.93% | 84.23% | 85.27% | 85.05%  | 85.07%  | 83.92%  |                   |
| Standard Deviation                | 3.16%                       | 3.39%             | 3.73%    | 4.80%  | 6.50%  | 7.59%  | 8.83%  | 10.28%  | 12.21%  | 13.73%  |                   |
| CoV                               | 3.89%                       | 4.16%             | 4.61%    | 5.89%  | 7.84%  | 9.01%  | 10.35% | 12.09%  | 14.35%  | 16.36%  |                   |

| Overall            |        |
|--------------------|--------|
| Average            | 82.19% |
| Standard Deviation | 10.24% |
| CoV                | 12.46% |

The Gross Loss Ratio Assumption is a Key Determinant in Establishing the Reinsurance Price

SOURCE: Highline Data and Federal Reserve Economic Database

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![](_page_15_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_16_Figure_1.jpeg)

SOURCE: Sample Insurance Company Data

![](_page_17_Picture_1.jpeg)

#### Standard & Poor's Reinsurance Outlook

#### **STRENGTHS**

- Continuation of strong pricing environment
- Improved risk-management and risk-modeling processes
- Continued strong investor support
- Moderating reserve-strengthening trends
- Expectation of reduced cyclicality driven by increased focus on profitability

#### **WEAKNESSES**

- Poor historical operating performance and high earnings volatility
- Potential increase in frequency of large natural catastrophe events

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- Significant retrocession capacity squeeze
- Potential over-reliance on capital markets for capital support
- Continued low barriers to entry

![](_page_18_Picture_14.jpeg)

"In 2007, AM Best believes that profit margins will likely be eroded to a certain extent as a result of stronger balance sheets, pricing deterioration, and increased competition; however, it should be another profitable year, for the US property / casualty industry as a whole."

- Review / Preview, January 2007

- AM Best Co.'s 2007 outlook for the global reinsurance sector is stable, which reflects a change from a negative outlook originally assigned nearly two years ago. However, should price deterioration and competition persist at a faster pace than anticipated, the outlook could be revised back to negative by the end of the year."
  - March 1, 2007 Press Release

- Overall a Very Healthy Market
- Softening Phase of the Underwriting Cycle Has Begun
- Reinsurance Costs Have Stabilized or Decreased Due to the Absence of Large CAT Losses and a Firm Pricing Environment in 2006
- Recapitalization From Internal Profits
  - Many Reinsurers Reported Record Performance in 2006
- Inflow of \$17B of New Capital to the Reinsurance Industry in 2006

![](_page_20_Picture_7.jpeg)

#### **Direction of Reinsurance Pricing in 2007**

#### Workers' Compensation:

- Lower Layers
- Mid Layers
- Catastrophe Layers

#### **Professional Lines:**

- D&O
- Medical Malpractice
- Miscellaneous E&O

#### Umbrella / Excess Liability:

- Standard Market
- Excess & Surplus Lines

![](_page_21_Picture_13.jpeg)

![](_page_21_Picture_14.jpeg)

![](_page_21_Picture_15.jpeg)

#### Professional Lines

- Terms are Holding / Reinsurers Selective
- Program Balance Very Important

#### Workers Compensation

 Fewer Reinsurers Interested in Per Person Exposed Layers Than Catastrophe Layers

#### Standard Casualty Protections

 Limits Exposed / Working Layers Heavily Dependent on Individual Company Experience, Original Rate Increases / Decreases, Limit / Attachment Distribution, Program Balance

![](_page_22_Picture_8.jpeg)

## What Casualty Reinsurance Product Innovations Have Occurred Recently?

![](_page_23_Picture_1.jpeg)

### What Casualty Reinsurance Product Innovations Have Occurred Recently?

- Workers' Compensation Catastrophe Protections
- Casualty Clash / Accumulation Protections
- D&O Systemic Protections

## What Should Be Considered Before Purchasing Casualty Reinsurance?

![](_page_25_Picture_1.jpeg)

### What Should Be Considered Before Purchasing Casualty Reinsurance?

- 1. Why is the Reinsurance Being Purchased?
- 2. What Risk is Intended to Be Transferred?
- 3. What Type of Reinsurance Protection is Being Considered?
- 4. What is the Best Premium Mechanism?
- 5. What is Covered?
- 6. Is It Cost Effective?
- 7. Is It Appropriately Transferring Risk?

![](_page_26_Picture_8.jpeg)

## What Factors Should Be Considered in Establishing a Retention?

- Impact on Policyholder Surplus
- Written Premium
- Impact of One Loss on Net Income
- Claims Frequency and Severity
- Capital Implications / Parent Company Support
- Cash Flow Implications
- Cost of Reinsurance / Market Conditions
- Rating Agency Impact
- Volatility of Underwriting Results
- Net Benefit of Reinsurance
- Return of Risk Adjusted Capital

![](_page_27_Picture_12.jpeg)

### **Volatility of Underwriting Result**

![](_page_28_Figure_1.jpeg)

Dynamic Financial Analysis is a Valuable Tool in Analyzing Continuum of Cost / Benefit Trade Offs of Alternative Structures and Retentions

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#### **Net Benefit of Reinsurance**

#### **Cash Flows Associated With Reinsurance Transactions**

XYZ Insurance Company

Retention Analysis

Net Benefit of Reinsurance Statistical Summary by Retention (Recoveries - Ceded Premium)

Evaluating Multiple Metrics Helps One to Triangulate Information to Identify the Optimal Structure

|                      | \$20M Retention | \$10M Retention | \$5M Retention | \$1M Retention | \$500K Retention |
|----------------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|
| 10 Year Return Time  | -467,280        | -1,264,725      | 843, 122       | 4,527,232      | 4,864,801        |
| 20 Year Return Time  | -467,280        | 1,021,174       | 5,282,831      | 9,837,265      | 10,276,168       |
| 50 Year Return Time  | 799,533         | 10,405,112      | 15,071,815     | 19,730,496     | 19,941,514       |
| 100 Year Return Time | 8,728,178       | 18,314,100      | 22,579,710     | 26,603,908     | 26,848,030       |
| 250 Year Return Time | 13,565,362      | 23,279,519      | 27,906,022     | 32,874,549     | 33,519,559       |
| 500 Year Return Time | 16,069,442      | 25,730,508      | 31, 143, 128   | 37,283,576     | 38,063,273       |
| Mean                 | -276,851        | -672,089        | -868,201       | -2,020,614     | -2,677,824       |
| Standard Deviation   | 1,516,055       | 3,071,531       | 4,170,479      | 6,293,231      | 6,864,855        |

99% Range of Outcomes

![](_page_29_Figure_8.jpeg)

![](_page_29_Picture_9.jpeg)

#### **Return on Risk Adjusted Capital**

#### XYZ Insurance Company

Return on Risk Adjusted Capital (RORAC) -- Cedent Perspective

![](_page_30_Figure_3.jpeg)

|   | \$500K Retention | \$1M Retention | \$5M Retention | \$10M Retention | \$20M Retention |
|---|------------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| (a) 1,000 Year Net Losses   | 34,515,622       | 40,817,234     | 51,599,890     | 57,763,276      | 66,737,190      |
| (b) 250 Year Net Losses   | 31,474,931       | 37,126,642     | 46,899,995     | 51,213,010      | 57,880,006      |
| (c) 100 Year Net Losses   | 29,528,171       | 34,436,201     | 43,051,362     | 47,181,129      | 52,683,943      |
| (d) Blended Net Losses {avg of (a), (b), (c)}                           | 31,839,575       | 37,460,026     | 47,183,749     | 52,052,472      | 59,100,380      |
| (e) Capital at Risk {(d) - (f) + (g)}                                   | 6,629,477        | 9,459,928      | 15,445,784     | 19,480,374      | 25,775,187      |
|   |                  |                |                |                 |                 |
| (f) Total Net Premium   | 36,460,098       | 39,250,098     | 42,987,965     | 43,822,098      | 44,575,193      |
| (g) Total Expenses  | 11,250,000       | 11,250,000     | 11,250,000     | 11,250,000      | 11,250,000      |
| (h) Expected Loss   | 17,091,787       | 19,284,324     | 21,974,543     | 22,630,392      | 23,024,179      |
| (i) Economic Gain/Loss {(f) - (g) - (h)}                                | 8,118,311        | 8,715,775      | 9,763,422      | 9,941,706       | 10,301,013      |
|   |                  |                |                |                 |                 |
| (j) Return on Invested Surplus  | 4%               | 4%             | 4%             | 4%              | 4%              |
| (k) Return on Capital at Risk {(i) / (e) + (j)}                         | 126.5%           | 96.1%          | 67.2%          | 55.0%           | 44.0%           |
|   |                  |                |                |                 |                 |
| (I) Marginal Return on Capital { [(i) - (i prior)] / [(j) - (j prior)]} |                  | 25.1%          | 21.5%          | 8.4%            | 9.7%            |

### What Factors Should Be Considered When Determining How Much Limit is Purchased?

- Per Occurrence and Aggregate Limits
- Per Policy Limits Exposure
- Workers Compensation Catastrophe Limit
  - Earthquake, Terrorism, and Industrial Accident Models

### Contingency / Clash Limit

- Exposure to Extra Contractual Obligations
- Exposure to Multiple Policy Accumulations

### Cost of Reinsurance / Market Conditions

![](_page_31_Picture_9.jpeg)

### **Top 5 Jury Verdicts in 2006**

![](_page_32_Picture_1.jpeg)

#### 1. \$216.7M: Medical Malpractice (Florida)

Navarro vs. Carrollwood Emergency Physicians

The largest verdict of 2006 went to a man who suffered severe brain damage after an unlicensed emergency physician's assistant misdiagnosed his stroke as a sinus infection. The case has subsequently settled.

![](_page_32_Picture_5.jpeg)

#### \$160M: Nursing Home Negligence (Texas) Mendoza vs. Summit Care Corp.

In the 3<sup>rd</sup> largest nursing home verdict in US history, a Texas jury awarded \$160M to the family of an elderly man who was severely beaten by his violent and mentally ill roommate. The case is on appeal.

FedEx

#### 3. \$106M:

2.

#### Wrongful Death (California) de Villers vs. Rossum

A toxicologist used drugs stolen from the state lab where she worked to poison her husband and make it look like a suicide. The victim's family sued to keep the defendant from profiting from her crimes through book contracts or movie rights. The verdict was reduced to \$16M and is now on appeal.

#### \$61M: Workplace Harassment (California)

#### Issa vs. Roadway Package Systems

Two Lebanese-American Federal Express drivers were the victims of ethnic discrimination and harassment at the company. The verdict was reduced to \$12.4M.

![](_page_32_Picture_15.jpeg)

#### **\$51M:** Vioxx (Louisiana)

#### Barnett vs. Merck

In the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest Vioxx verdict to date, a federal jury in New Orleans awarded \$51M to a 62year-old retired FBI agent who suffered a heart attack after taking the painkiller Vioxx. The damages portion of the case will be retried.

![](_page_32_Picture_19.jpeg)

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5.

## What Should a Company Consider When Buying Clash Reinsurance?

- Exposure to Private Passenger Type Losses
- Exposure to Industry Group Accumulations
- Significant Market Share in a State
- Claims Adjusting Culture
- Contract Language: Which Losses are Intended to Be Covered?
- Treatment of Loss Adjustment Expense
- Cost of Reinsurance

![](_page_33_Picture_8.jpeg)

### How Does TRIA Affect Casualty Reinsurance?

#### • Covered Lines Include:

 Commercial Lines of Property & Casualty, Including Excess, Workers' Compensation, Surety, and D&O Liability

### TRIA Coverage

- Foreign Terrorism Attacks Only
- CNBR Covered If Covered By Underlying Policy
- Event Trigger: \$100M
- Caps on Liability: \$100B Annually
- Individual Company Deductible: 20% (% of DEP of Prior Year)
- Co-Payment: 85% Federal / 15% Insurer
- TRIEA Expires on December 31, 2007 Unless Extended By Congress

![](_page_34_Picture_11.jpeg)

# What Should Be Expected From a Casualty Reinsurance Broker?

![](_page_35_Picture_1.jpeg)

## What Should Be Expected From a Casualty Reinsurance Broker?

- Advocacy
  - Program Structure, Negotiations, Terms & Conditions
- Transparency
- Market Breadth & Depth
- Ease of Administration
- Role in Original Business
- Broker Services

![](_page_36_Picture_8.jpeg)

## What Should Be Expected From a Casualty Reinsurance Broker?

- Assessment of Risk and Developing Risk Distributions
  - Catastrophe Modeling
  - Large Loss Distributions
  - Non-Cat Loss Volatility
  - Asset Risks
  - Other Risks
  - Correlations and Dependencies Identified
- Comprehensive Stochastic Financial Model
- Risk Measures in Total and By Desired Sub-Categories
  - By Source of Risk (UW, Cat, Asset)
  - By Region
  - By Line of Business
  - By Company or Business Unit
- Capital Allocations

|   |                    | (1)         | (2)               | (3)      | (4)          | (5)     | (6)       | (7)          | (8)      | (9)              |
|---|--------------------|-------------|-------------------|----------|--------------|---------|-----------|--------------|----------|------------------|
|   |                    | Total Risk  | Asset Risk        | N        | on CAT UW Ri | sk      | CAT Risk  |              |          |                  |
| Percentile  | Trial              | Operating   | Investment        | Reserves | Paid         | Paid    | CAT Loss  | CAT Loss     | CAT Loss | CAT Reins        |
| rercentilé  | 44151              | (1 529 502) | income<br>255.210 | 245 799  | durrent Af   | 102 501 | 0.400.675 | 1 72E 17E    | TOT FOO  | enefit<br>610.20 |
| 00.00   | 444 (01            | (1,028,502) | 200,319           | 240,700  | 419,507      | 192,501 | 4,932,075 | 1,720,170    | /0/,500  | 001.08           |
| 00.90   | 27040              | (350,059)   | (296.090)         | 222 502  | 410 196      | 122,002 | 1,070,009 | 110 162      | 46,600   | /0 50            |
| 99.00   | 41102              | (350,959)   | (200,909)         | 232,592  | 419,100      | 135,993 | 1 027 544 | 320.044      | 46,699   | 610.39           |
| 99.60   | 24196              | (252 516)   | (276 677)         | 215 763  | 363 110      | 176 838 | 67.831    | 67.831       | , 37,300 | (48 55           |
| 99.50   | 26371              | (230,310)   | (281 585)         | 220 127  | 369 187      | 187 585 | 19 526    | 19.526       |          | (48,55           |
| 99.40   | 2843               | (213 245)   | (203 114)         | 214 404  | 387 422      | 131 297 | 224 131   | 112 099      | 112 032  | 50.87            |
| 99.30   | 28716              | (200 740)   | (10 299)          | 215 759  | 386 710      | 156 691 | 774 363   | 245 384      | 528 980  | 446.87           |
| 99.20   | 33041              | (189 382)   | (50 170)          | 232 146  | 408.031      | 165 412 | 240.051   | 172 734      | 67 317   | 10.17            |
| 99.10   | 30507              | (180,348)   | (142,525)         | 243.941  | 430,833      | 177.044 | 33.707    | 33,707       | -        | (48.55           |
| 99.00   | 4699               | (171,343)   | (177,085)         | 241.357  | 426,498      | 152.351 | 21,753    | 21,753       | -        | (48.55           |
|   |                    | , , ,       | (,)               | .,       |              |         |           |              |          | (,               |
| 97.50   | 18720              | (104,458)   | (179,973)         | 218,907  | 403,315      | 119,474 | 30,490    | 30,490       | -        | (48,55           |
| 95.00   | 33162              | (53,623)    | (112,354)         | 243,268  | 374,751      | 153,873 | 17,078    | 17,078       | -        | (48,55           |
| Maan  |                    | 214 280     | 184 004           | 222 592  | 202 017      | 159 709 | EE 672    | 42 760       | 12 004   | (20.00           |
| 99% TVaR  |                    | (347,408)   | (22,097)          | 223,562  | 401,089      | 163,947 | 716,670   | 356,224      | 360,446  | 287,85           |
|   |                    |             | (                 |          |              |         |           |              |          |                  |
| Risk  |                    | 561,787     | 207,091           | 4,128    | 9,072        | 5,239   | 660,998   | 313,455      | 347,542  | 324,74           |
| (TVaR Less Mean - Sign  | n adjusted)        |             |                   |          |              |         |           |              |          |                  |
|   |                    | Net Risk \$ | Net Risk %        |          |              |         |           |              |          |                  |
| (A) Asset Risk  |                    | 207,091     | 36.86%            |          |              | Net Ris | ĸ         |              |          |                  |
| (B) Non CAT U   | JW Risk            | 18,439      | 3.28%             |          |              | Non     | CAT UW    |              |          |                  |
| (C) Cat Risk  |                    | 336,257     | 59.85%            |          |              |         | Risk      |              |          |                  |
| (D) Total Risk  |                    | 561,787     | 100.00%           |          |              |         | 3%        |              |          |                  |
|   |                    | Gross Risk  | Gross Risk %      |          | Asset Risk   |         | <u> </u>  |              |          |                  |
| (A) Asset Riek  |                    | 207.001     | 23.36%            |          | 37%          |         |           |              |          |                  |
| (B) Non CAT I   | IW Risk            | 18 439      | 20.30%            |          |              |         |           |              |          |                  |
| (D) HOLLONI C   |                    | 660,998     | 74,56%            |          | Υ            | V       |           |              |          |                  |
| (C) Cat Risk  |                    | 886 528     | 100.00%           |          |              | J       |           |              |          |                  |
| (C) Cat Risk<br>(D) Total Risk  |                    | 0001000     |                   |          |              |         |           | 4            |          |                  |
| (C) Cat Risk<br>(D) Total Risk  |                    |             |                   |          |              |         |           |              |          |                  |
| (C) Cat Risk<br>(D) Total Risk<br>Notes:<br>(A)=(2)   |                    |             |                   |          |              |         |           |              |          |                  |
| (C) Cat Risk<br>(D) Total Risk<br>Notes:<br>(A)=(2)<br>(B)=(3)+(4)+(5)  | )                  |             |                   |          |              |         |           | Cat E        | iak      |                  |
| (C) Cat Risk<br>(D) Total Risk<br>Notes:<br>(A)=(2)<br>(B)=(3)+(4)+(5)<br>(C) Net =(7)-(5)                    | )<br>3)-(9) Gross  | s = (6)     |                   |          |              | $\leq$  |           | Cat R        | isk      |                  |
| (C) Cat Risk<br>(D) Total Risk<br>Notes:<br>(A)=(2)<br>(B)=(3)+(4)+(5)<br>(C) Net =(7)+(5)<br>(D)=(A)+(B)+(6) | )<br>3)-(9), Gross | s = (6)     |                   |          |              |         |           | Cat R<br>609 | isk<br>6 |                  |

![](_page_37_Figure_16.jpeg)

![](_page_37_Picture_17.jpeg)

## How Can a Primary Insurance Actuary Position Him or Herself to Get a Trip to London or Bermuda as Part of the Reinsurance Placement Process?

#### How Can a Primary Insurance Actuary Position Him or Herself to Get a Trip to London or Bermuda as Part of the R/I Placement Process?

#### Primary Company Actuaries Impact Reinsurance Terms and Conditions

- Rate Change Information
- Interpreting Loss Development Triangles
- Rating Implication of Underwriting and / or Claims Reserving Practices

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- Trends: Their View and Supporting Work of Such (Sev & Freq)
- Policy Limit Shifts
- Cost Effect of Expansion / Contraction
- Perspective on the Environment: Tort Reform, etc.