



# Risk Pricing and the Nash Equilibrium

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# The Prisoner's Dilemma

## Golden Balls

	Split	Steal
Split	£6,800 £6,800	£13,600 £0
Steal	£0 £13,600	£0 £0

# In the Real World



# 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Data

Internet of Things

Telematics

Fraud Models

Building Characteristics

Credit Scoring

Crime Data/Models

Vehicle History Scoring

License Plate Recognition

Hurricane/Storm Models


# The Prisoner's Dilemma

## Risk Pricing

	No Data	Data
No Data	\$1000/ 1000	\$ 840/ 1240
Data	\$ 840/ 1240	\$ 840/ 1240

# Competitive Markets Should:

- ❖ Decrease insured losses
- ❖ Decrease insurance expenses
- ❖ Increase availability of insurance



# Risk Pricing (Data) Should:

- ❖ Decrease insured losses
- ❖ Decrease insurance expenses
- ❖ Increase availability of insurance
- ❖ Or, be uncostly.

# Case Studies:

- ❖ UBI
- ❖ Territory
- ❖ Vehicle History Score
- ❖ Loss/Violation History
- ❖ Protection Class
- ❖ *Decrease insured losses*
- ❖ *Decrease insurance expenses*
- ❖ *Increase availability of insurance*
- ❖ *Low Cost (or Free)*



# The Prisoner's Dilemma

## Golden Balls - A New Paradigm

	Honest	Liar
Split	£6,800 £6,800	£13,600 £0
Steal	£0 £0	£0 £0