Abstract
Twenty papers examine recent research in insurance economics. Part 1 contains six survey articles examining optimality of insurance contracting, liability insurance, moral hazard, adverse selection, insurance pricing, and econometric estimation of accident distributions. Part 2 presents fourteen essays on subjects of current research in (1) the theory of insurance economics, covering nonlinear expected utility, prudence, deviant beliefs, incomplete markets, increases in risk, and ambiguity; (2) problems of information, including moral hazard and competitive markets, adverse selection and probationary periods, incomplete information and risk categorization; and (3) empirical studies on workers‘ compensation, adverse selection, and the effects of no-fault automobile insurance. Dionne is at the University of Montreal. Index.
Series
Huebner international series on risk, insurance, and economic security
Year
1992
Categories
RPP1
Publications
Contributions to insurance economics, ed. by Georges Dionne